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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes Libya’s historic 2003 decision to abandon its weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) programs and normalize relations with the West. Despite the 
political and scholarly claims at the time, this thesis shows that the effectiveness of any 
specific policy instrument is best evaluated in the dynamic domestic and global 
geopolitical and economic contexts within which they are exercised.  A within case 
comparison of the 2003 reversal and two other Libyan policy reversals allows us to hold 
a number of key variables constant, while allowing U.S. coercive instruments to vary.  
This thesis generally finds that U.S. policy instruments were most effective when they 
worked to magnify or exacerbate an antecedent condition.  Specific lessons learned from 
the Libyan case could apply to counter proliferation efforts vs. Iran as well as future U.S. 
policy in Africa.   
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. PREVIOUS EXPLANATIONS ......................................................................1 
B. THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LIBYAN POLICY CHANGE ..............5 
C. THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: COERCIVE POLICY 
INSTRUMENTS ..............................................................................................6 
D.  ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS...................................................................12 
E.  ROADMAP.....................................................................................................12 
II. THE RISE AND FALL OF MILITANT ACTIVISM............................................15 
A. THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: MILITANT ACTIVISM.....................15 
B.  INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: U.S. POLICY FACTORS......................22 
1.  Negotiations ........................................................................................22 
2.  Sanctions .............................................................................................22 
3. U.S. Military Force ............................................................................23 
C.  ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS...................................................................24 
1.  Defeat in Chad....................................................................................24 
2.  Oil Bust ...............................................................................................25 
3.  Domestic Factors................................................................................26 
D.  CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................27 
III.  THE LOCKERBIE REVERSAL .............................................................................29 
A. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: THE MULTILATERAL 
APPROACH...................................................................................................30 
1. Military Threat...................................................................................30 
2. Sanctions .............................................................................................33 
a. Objectives and Results ............................................................36 
b.  Economic Costs .......................................................................37 
c.  Diplomatic Costs .....................................................................37 
B. ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS...................................................................40 
C. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................44 
IV.  THE 2003 ‘CONVERSION’ .....................................................................................47 
A. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ....................................................................50 
1. The End of Multilateral Sanctions ...................................................50 
2. Diplomacy and Negotiations .............................................................53 
B.  ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS...................................................................54 
C.  GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT .....................................................................55 
D.  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................58 
V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................61 
A. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................61 
B.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS...........................................................................64 
1. The Libyan Model in Farsi................................................................64 
C.  LOOKING AHEAD.......................................................................................66 
 viii
APPENDIX. LIBYAN REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY ...............................................69 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................73 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................81 
 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Volume of Libyan Oil Sold on the International Market...................................8 
Figure 2. Exports by the Price of Oil.................................................................................9 
Figure 3. Income to the State.............................................................................................9 
Figure 4. State Capacity ..................................................................................................10 
Figure 5. Deeb’s Neo-Realist Libyan National Interest Pyramid ...................................18 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. General Values of the Variables for Each of the Three Cases.........................12 
Table 2. Libyan Troops Deployed: Uganda and Chad...................................................19 
Table 3. Libyan-Sponsored Attempts at Destabilization: 1976–1986 ...........................20 
Table 4. Libyan Supported Terrorist Attacks.................................................................21 
Table 5. Sanctions Against Libya ..................................................................................34 
Table 6. Libya’s Agreements .........................................................................................39 
Table 7. European Rapprochement Timelines...............................................................51 
Table 8. U.S.-Libyan Rapprochement Timeline:...........................................................52 
Table 9. Differing Values of the Variables for Each of the Three Cases ......................64 
 
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ASF Africa Standby Force  
AU African Union 
 
EPSAs Exploration and Production-Sharing Arrangements  
 
ILSA Iran-Libya Sanctions Act  
IRA Irish Republican Army 
 
LIFG Libyan Islamic Fighting Group  
 
OAU Organization of African Unity  
OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
 
PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization 
 
RCC Revolutionary Command Council  
 
UAR United Arab Republic  
UN United Nations 
 
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction  
 xiv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank the following people for their insight, time and hard work, 
without which this thesis would not have been possible: Dr. James Russell, for the 
inspiring this project, Dr. Mohammed Hafez for expertly directing my research, Dr. 
Mary-Jane Deeb for finding time during her last day at the Library of Congress to answer 
my vague and open-ended questions, and Dr. Letitia Lawson for the incredible amount of 
time and effort that when it to transforming my initial effort into a work of which I can be 
proud. I learned the most from the professors that refused to lower the bar. Lastly, thanks 
to my wife and son, Dodie and Cooper. Sorry for the distracted conversations, the 
weekends spent reading and the nearly permanent pile of books and articles about Libya. 
I could not have done it without your love and support.     
 xvi




On December 19, 2003, Muammar al-Qadhafi announced Libya’s decision to 
dismantle all components of its nonconventional weapons programs; the existence of 
which he had denied for decades. In fact, as recently as January 2003, Qadhafi had told 
an American reporter that it was “crazy to think that Libya” had a weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) program.1 This dramatic policy reversal “marks the first time in 30 
years that any such nation has ended such a program without a regime change.”2 Libya 
also satisfied all the other conditions set forth by the United States and Britain to end 
economic sanctions including payments to the victims of the Pan Am flight 103 bombing 
and a renunciation of terrorism. What explains the Libyan reversal after decades of 
resistance? Could the lessons learned from Libya apply to other rogue states, such as 
Iran?  
A. PREVIOUS EXPLANATIONS  
A consensus exists in the literature that U.S. policy toward Libya was decisive, 
but there is a debate on which aspect of it—coercion or engagement–was the key. At the 
time of the Libyan reversal, the debate was framed along politically partisan lines. 
President Bush himself stated that the example of U.S. force in Afghanistan and Iraq was 
the decisive factor in Libya’s decision. “Nine months of intense negotiations succeeded 
with Libya while 12 years of diplomacy with Iraq did not…Words must be credible, and 
no one can now doubt the word of America.”3 In the other camp, Clinton administration 
officials credited secret negotiations underway since the 1999 surrender of the two Pan 
Am flight 103-terror suspects.4 The Libyans also claimed that the decision was not made 
                                                 
1 Lally Weymouth, “On Saddam, Lockerbie, Bin Laden and Peace: An Inclusive Interview with 
Muammar Gadhafi,” The Washington Post, January 12, 2003, B1. 
2 Joseph Cirincione, “The World Just Got Safer, Give Diplomacy the Credit,” The Washington Post, 
January 11, 2004. 
3 George W. Bush, remarks made during the first presidential debate with John Kerry in the fall of 
2004. 
4 Martin S. Indyk, “The Iraq War Did Not Force Gaddafi’s Hand,” Financial Times, March 9, 2004. 
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under duress but rather that it was a result of “a careful study of the country’s future in all 
its domains…conforming to the aspirations of the Libyan leadership and people.”5 
Qadhafi’s son and heir apparent, Seif al-Islam, claimed the December 19 agreement was 
a “win-win deal” for both sides.6  
Scholarly explanations are similarly divided on the role of coercion and 
diplomacy. Mary-Jane Deeb credits the Bush doctrine’s perceived threat to the Qadhafi 
regime as the decisive factor.7 St. John, Vandewalle and Boucek all discount the role of 
force and emphasize the role of long-term diplomacy.8 Jentleson and Whytock argue that 
Libya’s policy reversal was the most successful case of coercive diplomacy since the 
Cuban missile crisis but that the threat of force was not the key ingredient.9 They find 
that “although not the factor claimed by the Bush administration, U.S. credibility on the 
use of force was a factor.”10  
The weakness of these explanations is that they do not isolate the influence of the 
engagement and coercion variables, and therefore, cannot determine whether one or the 
other, or a balanced combination of the two, was responsible for it. The broader literature 
on U.S. coercive diplomacy toward Libya suffers from a similar infirmity. Coercive 
diplomacy usually involves the use of two key policy instruments: sanctions and the 
threat of force. Economic sanctions are widely credited with having a coercive effect on 
Libyan policymaking decisions.11 The threat of force is also widely credited with having 
                                                 
5 “Libyan Prime Minister Says Weapons Decision Motivated by Economy, Oil,” Al-Hayat, December 
24, 2003. 
6 “Libya: No Coercion in Weapons Agreement,” Associated Press Online, December 20, 2003. 
7 Mary-Jane Deeb, Interview by author, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. August 13, 2009. 
8 Ronald Bruce St. John, “’Libya is Not Iraq,’: Preemptive Strikes, WMD and Diplomacy,” Middle 
East Journal 58 (2004): 386–402; Diederik Vandewalle, “The Origins and Parameters of Libya’s Recent 
Actions,” Arab Reform Bulletin; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2004); Christopher 
Boucek, “Libya’s Return to the Fold?” Strategic Insights III (2004).  
9 Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A. Whytock, “Who ‘Won’ Libya?; The Force-Diplomacy 
Debate and Its implications for Theory and Policy,” International Security 30 (Winter 2005/06): 50  
10 Ibid., 80.  
11 Megan L. O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism (Washington 
D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2003); Mary-Jane Deeb, “Qadhafi’s Changed Policy: Causes and 
Consequences,” Middle East Policy VII (2000).  
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such an effect.12 However, since these instruments are both used in the same timeframe, 
it is again impossible to isolate their effects. Both literatures also tend to focus on U.S. 
policy instruments exclusively, and ignore other potential explanatory factors, which is 
especially problematic given that it is known that coercive diplomacy usually does not 
work.13 Many embattled target governments resist in the face of overwhelming force. 
Saddam Hussein chose to go down fighting rather than submit to U.S. demands. Castro 
subjected Cuba to decades of punishing U.S. sanctions rather than give in to U.S. 
demands. 
Another key problem with evaluating the effectiveness of specific instruments of 
coercion is that policy decisions are likely to be the product of many interacting 
influences. The U.S. instruments of coercive diplomacy might factor into the decision-
making process but so might many other considerations. If the U.S. invasion of Iraq 
increased ‘coercive credibility’ to the point that Qadhafi decided he had to settle all 
outstanding differences with the West, why did the bombing of Libya’s two largest cities 
in 1986 not produce a similar result? Similarly, if the 2003 reversal was the result of U.S. 
economic sanctions, why did greater sanctions by both the United States and the UN 
between 1992 and 1999 not produce such a reversal? This thesis shows that the 
effectiveness of any specific policy instrument is best evaluated in the dynamic domestic 
and global geopolitical and economic contexts within which they are exercised.  
A within case comparison of Libyan policy changes makes it possible to hold a 
number of key variables constants, while allowing U.S. coercive instruments to vary. 
Both the key decision maker and the official ideology have remained relatively constant 
since 1969. Of course, an individual’s decision-making process and ideology evolve over 
time, but as his September 2009 speech at the UN shows, Qadhafi still claims that the 
                                                 
12 Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity, 2004); George P. Shultz, Turmoil and 
Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), 687. 
13 Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, ed. The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2nd ed. 
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), 387; Lawrence Freedman, ed. Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 17; Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of 
Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002).  
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Green Book guides his foreign policy.14 Qadhafi’s ideology is largely inspired by 
Nasser’s Pan-Arab socialism of the 1950s but is also influenced by Qadhafi’s personal 
interpretation of Islam. The ‘Third Universal Theory’ first espoused in 1972 describes a 
middle way between western liberalism (capitalism and democracy) and communism. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the key characteristics of Qadhafi’s ideology that 
determine whether a policy constitutes an ideological reversal are activist militancy and 
anti-western/imperialism. See the Appendix for a more detailed discussion of official 
Libyan Ideology. 
On the other side, U.S. policy has evolved through presidential doctrines and the 
relative emphasis on sanctions and threats has thus varied. U.S. sanctions have been used 
against Libya since the Carter administration when Libya was placed on the state 
sponsors of terror list in 1979.15 As relations between Libya and the United States grew 
more hostile in the 1980s, economic ties between the two nations were completely cut-
off. In the wake of the Pan Am and UTA airline bombings, economic sanctions were 
employed by the UN until the surrender of the terror suspects in 1999. U.S. sanctions 
remained in effect until after the 2003 Libyan reversal. Military force has been used in 
multiple naval skirmishes beginning in 1982 under the Reagan administration and 
culminating in the 1986 U.S. bombing raid. The George H. W. Bush and Clinton 
administrations did not use force against Libya directly, but they both employed pre-
emptive strikes against suspected terror and WMD facilities.16 Finally, September 11, 
2001 led to a shift from the previous policy of pre-emption against facilities to the Bush 
Doctrine’s pre-emption against regimes.17 Jentleson and Whytock divide U.S. policy 
toward Libya into three periods. The first, 1981–1988, was characterized by sanctions 
and military force. The second, 1989–1998, shifted toward a more multilateral threat of 
force and sanction-based strategy. The third, 1999–2003, was characterized by secret 
                                                 
14 Neil MacFarquhar, “Libyan Leader Delivers a Scolding at U.N. Debut,” New York Times, 
September 24, 2009.  
15 St. John, “Libya is Not Iraq,” 401. 
16 Specifically tomahawk cruise missile strikes in Iraq in 1993 and 1996, as well as in Afghanistan and 
Sudan in 1998. 
17 Robert S. Litwak, “The New Calculus of Pre-emption,” Survival 44 (2003): 53–80. 
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negotiations, the end of UN sanctions and the changing nature of the U.S. military threat 
according to the Bush doctrine.18 These three periods correspond to the three significant 
Libyan policy changes studied in this thesis.  
B. THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LIBYAN POLICY CHANGE 
The most dramatic policy change is the 2003 abandonment of the WMD program 
and public acceptance of previous acts of terrorism. It clearly constitutes a turn away 
from Qadhafi’s anti-imperialist ideology. However, this was not the first significant step 
in the move away from Qadhafi’s ideology. To evaluate what worked in 2003, this thesis 
explores what factors were at play in other policy reversals. Therefore, the study also 
includes two previous policy reversals; the sharp drop in all forms of militancy that 
occurred in 1987, and the surrender of the two Pan Am flight 103 terror suspects in 1999, 
both of which constitute significant reversals of policy. After over a decade of aggression 
in the form of deployment of conventional military force, support for insurgents and overt 
support for terrorism, nearly all forms of military activism ceased in 1987. The number of 
troops deployed outside Libya dropped from over 16,000 at a peak in 1983 to zero in 
1988.19 Destabilization efforts in the developing world stopped. Terrorist acts slowed to a 
trickle.20 In 1999, the two Pan Am flight 103-terror suspects were surrendered for trial in 
the Netherlands after eight years of negotiations. The 1987, 1999 and 2003 policy 
reversals were all contrary to state ideology, and each happened in the context of a 
different level of U.S. military threat and sanctions, as well as different levels of internal 
dissent and greatly different international environments. By comparing the differences in 
coercive policies in the context of different domestic and international environments, the 
effectiveness of the U.S. policy instruments can be better evaluated. In general, this thesis  
 
                                                 
18 Jentleson and Whytock. “Who ‘Won’ Libya?,” 50. 
19 Mario J. Azevedo, A History of War in Chad, 148. Although a small number of Libyans remained 
inside the Aouzou Strip inside Chad until 1994, they never posed a threat to Chad as they had up to that 
point. 
20 Stephan D. Collins, “Dissuading State Support of Terrorism; Strikes or Sanctions?” Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 27 (2004): 24. Sadly, the last gasps of Libya’s state sponsored terrorism resulted in 
the most people killed. Both the Pan Am flight 103 and the UTA flight 772 bombings happen after 1987.  
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finds that despite the claims at the time, U.S. attempts to coerce Libyan policy were most 
effective when they magnified domestic or international pressures already influencing 
Libyan decision making.  
C. THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: COERCIVE POLICY 
INSTRUMENTS 
Two instruments of U.S. foreign policy represent two key independent variables: 
military force and sanctions. Jentleson and Whytock define “coercive credibility” as “the 
coercer state convincingly conveys to the target state that noncooperation has 
consequences.”21 However, this definition is of limited use because whether a target state 
was ‘convinced’ is only measureable by response, which makes the argument tautological 
(if the target responded, it must have been convinced). A better method of measuring 
military threats is by the coercer’s objectives and commitment to a military solution. This 
thesis uses George, Hall and Simons’ categorization of policy objectives. A type A 
objective is one that attempts to convince the target “to stop short of the goal.” A type B 
objective attempts to get the target “to undo the action.” A type C is aimed at “cessation 
of the opponent’s hostile behavior through a demand for change in the composition of the 
adversary’s government or in the nature of the regime.”22 The distinction between types 
B and C is key to understanding effective coercion because type C can cross the upper 
limit of proportional coercion. In other words, because regime change is usually a threat 
to the personal survival of the targeted leader, coercion fails because the cost of 
compliance is as high as, or higher than, the cost of continuing to resist.  
Objective alone is not enough to measure the coerciveness of a threat; it must be 
linked to the coercer’s level of commitment. The U.S. commitment to coercing Libya in 
1986 was limited to covert logistics and intelligence support to Libya’s enemies in Chad, 
naval skirmishes in the Mediterranean and a single ‘retaliatory’ air raid, even though the 
objective was both policy and regime change (Type B/C). The U.S. commitment to 
Operation Desert Shield/Storm was more sustained involving hundreds of thousands of 
                                                 
21 Jentleson and Whytock, “Who ‘Won’ Libya?,” 52.  
22 George, Hall, and Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 10. 
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troops deployed over a period of months, while the objective was exclusively policy 
change (Type B). The U.S. commitment to Operation Iraqi Freedom was greater still 
lasting over six years to date. By categorizing external threats according to their objective 
type (limited or existential) and the overall commitment (short-term or sustained), a more 
complete measure of ‘coercive credibility’ is attained. In the case of Libya, external 
threats were most likely to coerce a policy reversal when they were existential and 
sustained.  
Libya is an excellent target nation to study the effectiveness of economic 
sanctions because the economy is almost entirely dependent on oil exports and it is a 
rentier state. In rentier states, rents accrue directly to the state from an external source, 
and “only a few are engaged in the generation of this rent (wealth), the majority being 
only involved in the distribution or utilization of it.”23 As the government loses its ability 
to fulfill its distributive social contract, it becomes more vulnerable to internal dissent. 
Conversely, the more money coming in, the more secure the regime becomes because it 
can afford to buy-off internal dissent and to pay for a larger security apparatus. Libya 
should have been very vulnerable to economic sanctions, just as Iraq was after the 1991 
Gulf War. However, unlike Iraq, the multilateral sanctions never actually targeted 
Libya’s oil sales. The United States stopped buying Libyan oil in the 1980s but the UN 
sanctions did not restrict Europe from continuing to buy Libyan oil. However, both U.S. 
and UN sanctions did target Libya’s oil industry infrastructure. Bans on oil industry 
equipment and technology exports to Libya were intended to inflict an economic cost that 
would coerce a policy change. Since the desired policy change was eventually achieved, 
it is tempting to credit the sanctions alone. However, this approach is logically backward. 
If the sanctions were intended to coerce a policy change by damaging Libya’s oil 
industry, the effectiveness of the sanctions must be measured by their effect on Libyan oil 
production. Additionally, the changing price of oil would have an even more pronounced  
 
 
                                                 
23 Hazem Beblawi, “The Rentier State in the Arab World,” in The Rentier State, ed. Hazem Beblawi 
and Giacomo Cuciani (New York: Croom Help, 1987), 51. 
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influence on the Libyan economy than oil production. Taken together, the effect on 
Libyan oil production and the global economic context provide a better means to evaluate 
the effectiveness of sanctions and an instrument of coercion.  
Although Libyan government reports are not reliable, the volume of Libyan oil 
sold on the international market is available from international sources (Figure 1). 
Multiplying exports by the price of oil (Figure 2) produces income to the state (Figure 3). 
Since the regime’s security is dependent on buying-off potential opposition, the larger the 
population, the more patronage is required. If the income remained constant while the 
population was increasing, the regime would become less able to fulfill its rentier social 
contract. At the time of the Young Officer’s coup in 1969, Libya had a population of less 
than two million. Today, it is over six million. Thus, oil revenue is divided by population 
for the final measure of state capacity (Figure 4). This graph shows that despite the 
changing nature of different sanctions imposed by different countries, Libyan oil earnings 
were more dependent upon the international price of oil than anything else.  
 
Figure 1.   Volume of Libyan Oil Sold on the International Market.24  
                                                 
24 Energy Information Administration, “OPEC Revenues Fact Sheet,” August 2009. 
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Figure 2.   Exports by the Price of Oil25 
 
Figure 3.   Income to the State26 
                                                 
25 “Crude Oil Prices since 1861,” British Petroleum; Statistical Review of World Energy 2009, 
http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9023758&contentId=7044107. 
26 Figure 3 is the product of the annual production times the average international price of oil 




Figure 4.   State Capacity27 
The following analysis evaluates the costs and benefits associated with each 
policy change studied employing the standards used by Jentleson and Whytock: 
reciprocity and proportionality. The former measures the diplomatic instrument while the 
latter measures the level of threat. “‘Reciprocity’ involves an explicit, or at least mutually 
tacit, understanding of linkage between the coercer’s carrots and the target’s 
concessions.”28 In other words, it is the ‘deal on the table.’ If the deal is accepted, the 
Libyan policy change results in an immediate and overt response. This would be a highly 
reciprocal arrangement. If there is no ‘deal on the table,’ a policy change results in slow 
or muted U.S. reaction. A Libyan policy change made in the hopes of being countered 
with a beneficial U.S. policy, or in response to other factors, is not a reciprocal 
arrangement.  
                                                 
27 Figure 4 is the annual totals from Figure 3 divided by Libya’s annual population as measured by the 
World Bank, World Development Indicator, http://datafinder.worldbank.org/about-world-development-
indicators. 
28 Jentleson and Whytock, “Who ‘Won’ Libya?, 52. 
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Proportionality” refers to the relationship within the coercer’s strategy 
between the scope and nature of the objectives being pursued and the 
instruments being used in their pursuit. The more the coercer demands of 
the target, the higher the target’s costs of compliance and the greater the 
need for the coercer’s strategy to increase the costs of noncompliance and 
the benefits of compliance.29  
In other words, the coercive influence must be strong enough to equal the costs of the 
target’s policy change or continued resistance. There is an upper and lower limit of 
proportionality. The lower limit is zero meaning that a coercive policy has such a low 
coercive influence on the policy maker’s decision-making process that it does not even 
enter the cost/benefit analysis. However, some policy changes are not coercible. For 
example, regime change is often a matter of life or death for the targeted policy maker. 
The cost of economic sanctions never is proportional with the cost of regime change. 
Sanctions that damage a targeted country’s economy, and therefore, reduce the 
government’s ability to distribute patronage to quell internal dissent, may result in the 
leader accepting the demands of the sanction’s sender. More often than not, however, the 
leader attempts to coup-proof the regime and assumes a repressive ‘bunker mentality’ 
rather than comply with the demands of the coercer, as happened in Saddam’s Iraq under 
sanctions.  
A non-coerced policy change involves a quid pro quo, usually the product of 
negotiations. Those policy changes that result from a quid pro quo response (both 
reciprocal and proportional) are credited to incentives and not coercion. For example, a 
negotiated settlement in which both parties are seen to compromise a similar amount is 
not a coerced agreement. On the other hand, if one party compromises much more than 
the other party does, the agreement is considered to be coerced by something. This does 
not mean that all unreciprocated or non-proportional Libyan policy changes are due to 
specific U.S. policy instruments. The Libyan government could be reacting to factors 
known or unknown to U.S. policy makers or negotiators. It does, however, show the 
degree to which these policy changes were a response to negotiated incentives.  
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Table 1 summarizes the general values of the variables for each of the three cases.  
Table 1.   General Values of the Variables for Each of the Three Cases 
Year Policy Objective Threat Sanctions Result 
1987 B and C Existential Not Very Not Proportional 
  But limited Effective Not Reciprocal 
1999 B Non-existential Somewhat Proportional 
  And Limited Effective Reciprocal 
2003 B Implied Existential Not Very Somewhat-Proportional
  And Sustained Effective Somewhat-Reciprocal 
 
Assigning values to the variables helps explain the coercive mechanisms of the three 
policy reversals. However, it is not until the domestic and international context of each 
policy reversal is considered can the influence of specific U.S. policy instruments be 
evaluated.  
D.  ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS 
In addition to the terms of the policy change and the specific instruments designed 
to produce it, this analysis also considers the influence of two types of antecedent 
conditions: domestic pressure groups and the overall role of the changing international 
environment. Unless the domestic and international contexts of the Libyan policy 
changes are accounted for, what seems a reaction to a specific coercive policy may be a 
result of a completely different decision-making calculus. In general, this thesis finds that 
the antecedent conditions were more influential than any particular U.S. or UN policy 
instrument by itself. However, in all three cases, when the policy instrument worked to 
magnify or exacerbate an antecedent condition, it was more effective. 
E.  ROADMAP 
This thesis examines the particular environments in which the three policy 
changes were made and how the two U.S. policy instruments of sanctions and threats of 
military force contributed. Chapter II discusses the 1987 abandonment of military 
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activism, arguing that while U.S. military force was employed in the year before this 
reversal, several other domestic considerations contributed more significantly to the 
change in policy. Chapter III reviews the decision to surrender the two Pan Am flight 103 
terror suspects in 1999. This policy change occurred in the context of significant 
sanctions, and some level of U.S. threat of force, but again, domestic factors, especially 
the rise and fall of anti-Qadhafi Islamists, and international factors, especially the end of 
the Cold War and the New World Order, were also important. Chapter IV studies the 
international and domestic environment in which the 2003 reversal occurs. During this 
short period, the defeat of the Islamists and end of multilateral sanctions are countered by 
an increasing threat of military force after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. 
Finally, Chapter V draws conclusions from the comparative analysis of all three 
decisions, and considers their implications for coercive diplomacy in other rogue states, 
as well as future policy toward Libya and Africa. 
 14
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II. THE RISE AND FALL OF MILITANT ACTIVISM 
Nineteen eighty-seven marks the end of Libyan militancy. After nearly a decade 
of aggressive foreign policy, the Libyan military stood down, material support for 
insurgents abruptly dropped off and the number of sponsored terrorist acts fell sharply. 
What explains this policy reversal? This chapter explores the historical context of this 
policy change and measures the effects of U.S. policy instruments to determine how, and 
how much, they influenced Libyan decision making.  
A. THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: MILITANT ACTIVISM  
Political and economic conditions in the 1960s and 1970s set the stage for a rise 
in Libyan military activism. The coup that deposed King Idris in 1969 came at a time of 
unprecedented anti-western sentiment in the Arab world. Nasser’s United Arab Republic 
had disintegrated in 1961. The combined militaries of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan were 
soundly defeated by Israel in 1967. The Arab world blamed both of these developments 
on Western support of Israel. Finally, despite Qadhafi’s strident Pan Arab rhetoric and 
willingness to support an anti-Israel war effort, Egypt and Syria chose not to include, or 
even inform, Libya prior to their Pan Arab attack on Israel in 1973. Inside Libya, 
simmering Arab resentment against Israel and the West combined with a sense of 
abandonment with regard to the rest of the Arab world. Libya was left to go it alone 
against what it determined ‘Imperialist’ powers and their puppet states.  
Economically, the coup came at a time of unprecedented, and still increasing, 
state wealth in Libya. In the last ten years of the monarchy, oil’s contribution to Libya’s 
GDP jumped from 27 percent to 65 percent.30 Four years after the coup, oil was the only 
commodity Libya exported.31 At the same time, the price began a climb from around 
$18/barrel in 1973 to a high of over $90/barrel in 1979 (Figure 1). The 1973 Arab-Israeli 
war created a boom in the price of oil that that would last over a decade and resulted in an 
                                                 
30 Dirk Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya (New York; Cambridge University Press, 2006), 91. 
31 Ibid., 113. 
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estimated $95 billion windfall.32 This income was largely collected by the state under 
Exploration and Production-Sharing Arrangements (EPSAs) first implemented in 1973.33 
This arrangement granted international oil companies rights over Libyan acreage but left 
sub-surface mineral rights in the hands of the state. The companies were in effect made 
contractors of the Libyan state. This new and increasing income stream meant the Libyan 
government was fueled by almost unlimited funds during the 1970s. Of the $26.3 billion 
government budget in 1975, $23 billion was funded out of oil revenues that accrued 
directly to the state.34 By 1971, the petroleum sector had come to account for 70 percent 
of its GDP. The rest of the economy taken together only contributed about 20 percent of 
its GDP.35 In sum, Libya, being left out of the Pan Arab war against Israel in 1973, 
provided the inspiration and ideological justification for an ambitious militant foreign 
policy. In addition, huge inflows of oil revenue following the 1973 war provided the 
means to sustain an activist militant foreign policy. Moreover, because of the rentier 
nature of the state, little domestic resistance existed as long as oil revenues remained 
high.  
Prior to 1973, Qadhafi and the other self-proclaimed ‘Young Officers’ of the 
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), were ideological disciples of Nasser. In fact, 
Qadhafi openly sought Nasser’s praise and support after the 1969 coup. “Tell President 
Nasser we made this revolution for him. He can take everything of ours and add it to the 
rest of the Arab world’s resources to be used for the battle [against Israel, and for Arab 
unity].”36 However, Nasser died less than a year after the Libyan coup. Egypt’s new 
president, Anwar El Sadat, did not consider Qadhafi a dependable ally. The ‘October 
War’ of 1973 between the combined forces of Egypt and Syria against Israel marks a 
pivotal moment for Qadhafi. Sadat and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad initiated a Pan-
                                                 
32 Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991 (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2002), 360. 
33 Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, 110. 
34 Ibid., 111. 
35 Libya; Income and Wealth, Encyclopedia of Nations, Based on the Country Studies Series by 
Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress. 
36 Mohammed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (New York: New York Times Book Co., 1975), 70. 
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Arab attack against Israel without including or even informing him. The resulting peace 
treaty between Egypt and Israel meant that Qadhafi had lost a key ally in his own anti-
Israeli agenda. From that point on, Qadhafi’s ideology and military activism became 
more his own.  
His 1973 Zuwara speech signaled the direction of his ‘cultural revolution.’ In 
Islamic and Bedouin terms, Qadhafi prescribed a form of direct popular democracy.37 It 
rejected both the representative government of the West and socialist institutions of the 
East.38 People’s Power, or direct democracy, was imposed at every level of Libyan 
society, with the notable exception of the oil sector. Traditional interest groups were 
marginalized as popular committees were placed in charge of all government activities. 
Within two years, the dismantling of the country’s institutions in favor of the popular 
committees led to political chaos, inefficiency and waste. Technocrats within the RCC 
wanted a more orderly, planned political system and a carefully designed economic plan. 
Qadhafi’s faction wanted to maintain the revolution domestically and pursue a more 
activist foreign policy.39 Tension between the factions resulted in a failed ‘technocratic 
coup’ in August 1975. The coup leaders fled to Tunis, where they would remain the voice 
of the opposition. Qadhafi used the opportunity to consolidate his personal control over 
the RCC and push forward his revolutionary agenda.  
The 1975-failed technocratic coup marks the beginning of Libya’s ideological 
foreign policy activism.40 Its three main instruments were conventional military force, 
support to insurgents and sponsorship of terrorism. These were generally applied 
according to what Deeb calls the national interest pyramid (Figure 5).41 Conventional 
force was mostly used against Libya’s neighbors, destabilization against governments 
(further down the pyramid) not an immediate security threat and terrorism against the 
West and Israel (at the bottom of the pyramid).  
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The higher the target country is in this pyramid, the more likely foreign policy it is motivated by 
core security-led concerns. The lower on the pyramid, the more likely foreign policy it is 
motivated by ideology. 
 
Figure 5.   Deeb’s Neo-Realist Libyan National Interest Pyramid 
Qadhafi had already increased the size of the army from 6,500 in 1969 to 20,000 
in 1970. The huge increase in oil revenue after 1973, in conjunction with Egypt’s peace 
settlement with Israel, led to an increase in military spending from $60 million in 1970 to 
$2.3 billion in 1979.42 In the early 1980s, arms imports comprised over 40 percent of 
imports.43 By 1987, Libya had more weapons than it could use.44 Its relatively small 
population made manning Qadhafi’s war machines a challenge. Universal conscription 
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became law in 1978. That year, the size of the military increased to nearly 55,000 simply 
to operate all the weapons Libya was buying.45 Qadhafi bolstered his national armed 
forces with mercenaries. The Islamic Legion, inspired by the French Foreign Legion, was 
to be composed of foreign volunteers who would spearhead Libya’s trans-Saharan 
military adventures. However, most were poor Saharan immigrants pressed into 
service.46 The size of the army peaked at 68,000 in 1987.47 Four interventions in Chad 
were by far the largest uses of the Libyan military outside Libya.48 Table 2 shows the 
scale of Libyan conventional military deployments. Despite continuing Pan-Arab, anti-
Zionist and anti-Western rhetoric, most men and material were used against the least 
ideological targets.49  
Table 2.   Libyan Troops Deployed: Uganda and Chad 
Libyan Troops Deployed to Uganda 
Year Number Type 
1972–5 40050 Advisors for not recognizing Israel 
1976–7 Approx 400+ Advisors post Israeli raid on Entebbe 
1978–9 4,50051 2,500 Libyans and 2,000 Islamic Legion 
Libyan Troops Deployed to Chad 
1978 300052–400053 Fire Support for Frolinat rebels 
1979 2000–3000 Fire Support for Volcan rebels 
1980 14,00054 7,000 Libyans, 7,000 Islamic Legion 
1981 10,00055 Est. withdrawn into Aouzou 
1982 10,000 Est. withdrawn into Aouzou 
1983 16,00056 9,000 Libyans, 7,000 Islamic Legion 
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Libyan Troops Deployed to Chad 
1984 16,000 9,000 Libyans, 7,000 Islamic Legion 
1985 7,00057 Libyans supporting GUNT 
1986 8,00058 Libyans supporting GUNT 
1987 15,00059 French and Chadian sources claim 20,000 
 
No reliable data exists on Libyan sponsored destabilization attempts globally. 
However, Lemarchand’s data for Africa provides some perspective as to the number and 
scope of destabilization efforts (Table 3). Qadhafi’s anti-Imperialist ideology combined 
with huge oil revenues to produce a foreign policy of destabilization of any government 
deemed a puppet of the West. As Lemarchand’s data shows, Libyan destabilization 
efforts ranged from financial support of rebel groups to coup attempts by Libyan trained 
commandos. After 1987, these numerous and diverse destabilization efforts would end.  
Table 3.   Libyan-Sponsored Attempts at Destabilization: 1976–198660 
Military Training and Support of Anti-Regime Elements 
Target Date Type of Operation 
Burkina Fasso 1982–83 Arms and funding to Colonel Sankara, thus 
contributing to his successful military take-
over (1983). 
Gambia 1981 Arms and funding for abortive coup. 
Niger 1976 Abortive Libyan-inspired coup. 
 1982 Abortive raid against Arlit by Libyan trained 
Tamchakent elements (Touaregs). 
Mali 1982 Abortive raid by Libyan-trained commandos.  
Sudan 1975–85 Military and financial assistance to southern 
based rebellion. 
 1975, 76, 83 Abortive Libyan-sponsored coups. 
Somalia 1978–85 Military and financial support to Somalian 
Salvation Front. 
Western Sahara 1976–84 Mil. and financial support to Polisario 
Zaire 1976–86 Financial support to National Front for the 
Liberation of Congo. 
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Finally, Libya trained terrorists and provided them "rent-free offices, 
headquarters, and villas.”61 In 1980, Libya established the Anti-Imperialism Centre, also 
known as the Mathaba International, an international think-tank of terrorist policy.62 As 
was noted at the time, “no regime was as brazen and arrogant in terrorist policies as 
Libya.”63 Table 4 shows the number of terrorist acts attributed to Libya went from a high 
of over two dozen attacks in 1984 to only a few just three years later.64  
 
Table 4.   Libyan Supported Terrorist Attacks 
Year Number Year Number
1981 8 1991 0 
1982 0 1992 0 
1983 1 1993 1 
1984 25 1994 0 
1985 17 1995 0 
1986 Pre-airstrike 9 1996 0 
1986 Post-airstrike 10 1997 0 
1987 7 1998 0 
1988 2 1999 0 
1989 1 2000 0 
1990 2   
 
By 1987, all forms of ideologically militant foreign policy almost completely 
stopped, with the notable exception of two commercial airline bombings. What caused 
this policy change? U.S. sanctions and military force were employed prior to the change, 
but as the rest of this chapter shows, other factors loom larger in the explanation.  
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B.  INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: U.S. POLICY FACTORS 
1.  Negotiations 
The 1987 reversal could not have been affected by U.S. diplomacy because there 
was none. Diplomatic relations between the United States and Libya had been completely 
severed in the years before, and the Reagan administration sought to force an end to 
Libya’s military activism without a ‘deal on the table.’ In 1985, the United States 
increased military aid to anti-Libyan Chadian forces and considered sponsoring a 
Chadian overthrow of the Libyan government.65 No reciprocity was offered before the 
1987 reversal, none was given after, and Libya remained rhetorically committed to using 
terrorism against the United States and other imperialist powers.  
2.  Sanctions 
When the United States designated Libya a ‘state sponsor of terror’ in December 
1979, four different types of sanctions took effect: restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance, 
a ban on the sale and export of defense related items, strict limitations on dual-use items, 
and the United States would vote to oppose loans and aid from international financial 
institutions.66 In 1982, Reagan banned the import of Libyan crude oil and the export of 
oil and refinery equipment to Libya. In 1985, refined petroleum products were added to 
the import ban.67 After Libya was implicated in terrorist attacks on the Rome and Vienna 
airports later in 1985, all trade between the United States and Libya was blocked. All 
commercial contracts with American oil companies were suspended, and all Libyan 
government assets in the United States were frozen.68 Simply put, the United States had 
cut all economic relations with Libya by 1986. No effect on the Libyan economy was 
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immediately apparent. The drop in oil exports to the United States was completely offset 
by increased exports to Europe, especially Italy.69 Only the ban on U.S. oil industry 
technology had a substantial affect. Since U.S. oil companies initially opened most of the 
Libyan oil fields in the late 1950s and 1960s, their continued productivity was dependent 
on United States produced spare parts. However, this effect became significant only over 
time, and could not have contributed significantly to the decision to end most forms of 
militancy in 1987.  
3. U.S. Military Force 
Libya’s territorial claim over the Gulf of Sidra was the impetus for numerous and 
escalating U.S. naval provocations beginning in 1980. In September 1980, a Libyan 
fighter fired a missile at an American EC-135. In August 1981, two Libyan SU-22s fired 
missiles at two Navy F-14s escorting the Libyan planes out of a U.S. declared exercise 
area in disputed waters. The F-14s evaded the missiles and then shot down the two 
Russian-built fighters. In 1983, two F-14s once again intercepted a Libyan fighter over 
the Gulf of Sidra, but no shots were exchanged.70 The naval skirmishes peaked in March 
1986 when U.S. forces inside the Gulf of Sidra responded to Libyan fire by sinking two 
Libyan patrol boats and damaging Libyan ground-based radar and missile sites.71  
The nature of U.S. military force changed after Libya was found responsible for 
the April 5, 1986, Berlin disco bombing. Operation El Dorado Canyon was launched on 
April 15 in retaliation for this and other acts of terrorism. Over 100 U.S. aircraft were 
involved in strikes on five sets of targets within Libya. Among them were Qadhafi’s 
command and control center, two military airfields, and two terrorist training camps.72 
The raid caused “considerable damage to Libya’s terrorist infrastructure and generated  
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short-term political instability in Tripoli,” demonstrating a credible (although limited) 
threat to the Qadhafi regime.73 The U.S. air raid was an attempt to force both policy 
change and regime change, since Qadhafi’s residence was targeted.74  
The 1986 raid initially seemed successful. Qadhafi did not appear on television 
for two days after the raid. There were rumors of an organized domestic resistance.75 The 
response to government calls for anti-U.S. rallies was lackluster.76 However, Qadhafi was 
able to rally public support with nationalist and revolutionary rhetoric within 48 hours.77 
After a short period of chaos, Qadhafi reconsolidated his position and even managed to 
deflect domestic resentment over the economic downturn to resentment of the U.S. 
attack. On one hand, the 1986 raid raised the cost of supporting terrorism. On the other 
hand, its limited nature weakened U.S. coercive credibility.78  
C.  ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS 
1. Defeat in Chad 
The most significant contributor to the end of activist militancy was the 1987 
defeat in Chad. Qadhafi had suffered small-scale military defeats since the late 1970s. 
The Egyptian army destroyed dozens of Libyan tanks and aircraft in a border skirmish in 
1977.79 The attempt to defend Idi Amin from a Tanzanian invasion in 1979 was a 
complete failure and cost Libya between 40080 and 600 dead and nearly 1,000 wounded 
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out of a deployed force of only 4,500, along with nearly all its military equipment.81 
Libya also suffered significant losses in Chad prior to 1987, but the September 1987 
defeat was by far the worst. Chadian forces not only defeated the Libyan forces deployed 
inside Chad but also pushed north into Libyan territory destroying an air base and killing 
hundreds. As many as 3,600 Libyan troops were killed in 1987, and between $1 and $1.5 
billion in military equipment destroyed or captured.82 A nation one-fiftieth the size of the 
United States had suffered as many killed in one year as the United States had in eight 
years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Qadhafi had committed over a third of his army and 
over half of his Air Force and lost. This defeat contributed to the abandonment of military 
activism in two different ways. First, it was destructive enough to limit the ability of the 
Libyan military to deploy effectively until re-equipped, at a time when re-equipping was 
much more difficult because of collapsing oil revenues.83 Second, the military was 
demoralized and a growing threat to the Qadhafi regime. The military already posed a 
significant threat to the Qadhafi government. As the military’s operational tempo 
increased, so too did the number of acts of military rebellion. Harris counts “fifteen 
serious assassination attempts…almost all conducted by the military”84 between 1976 
and 1985. That trend would only become more pronounced after the defeat in Chad. 
Qadhafi had to concentrate on securing his regime rather than large-scale military 
activism abroad.  
2.  Oil Bust  
Oil revenue declined dramatically in the mid 1980s (Figure 3) mostly because of a 
steadily declining international price of oil after 1979 (Figure 2). The economic impact 
was substantial, especially coming on the heels of domestic economic disasters caused by 
                                                 
81 Pollack, Arabs at War, 373. 
82 Hussein Solomon, and Gerrie Swart, “Libya’s Foreign Policy in Flux,” African Affairs 416 (2005): 
474; Ronen, Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics, 171. 
83 As evidenced by an increase in Libyan arms purchases after 1987. Despite flat government 
revenues, Libya’s arms imports as a percentage of total imports grew seven percent in the two years after 
the defeat in Chad. O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism, 207.  
84 Lillian C. Harris, Libya: Qadhafi’s Revolution and the Modern State (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1986), 76. 
 26
‘revolutionary’ economic policies. Economic performance in Libya was often 
substantially worse than that in other OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries) countries due to mismanagement and radical economic reforms. The 
economic impact of Libyan mismanagement and the collapse of the international price of 
oil were far more damaging to Libya’s economy than U.S. sanctions.85 At the same time, 
the Qadhafi government was becoming more threatened by a demoralized military; it was 
losing the economic means to quell domestic resentment. The oil bust not only made it 
harder to continue a policy of activist militancy because of an inability to buy 
replacement military equipment, but also, because the government was less able to co-opt 
domestic resentment through patronage.  
3.  Domestic Factors 
By the late 1980s, the Libyan people were also reaching the limit of revolution. 
Qadhafi’s radical ideology had been imposed on the people though ubiquitous ‘popular’ 
committees intended to mobilize support for the regime. The popular committees were, in 
theory, institutions of direct democracy by which the people could directly control their 
government. In reality, a small clique at the top of the Qadhafi government made 
important domestic and foreign policy decisions. Soon, the popular committees were not 
even trusted to manage routine affairs without potentially threatening the regime. In 
1976, revolutionary committees were instituted as a supervisory network inside every 
popular committee level of government, society and the military.86 They were primarily 
composed of young Qadhafi loyalists responsible to Qadhafi himself and endowed with 
sweeping and arbitrary power to ensure the loyalty to the government. By 1980, the 
revolutionary committees had become a key element of the regime’s security apparatus. 
They were given the right to pursue the ‘physical liquidation of the enemies of the 
revolution’ abroad and the authority to create revolutionary courts based on the ‘law of  
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the revolution.’87 The result was a police state. What began as an experiment in direct 
democracy and political mobilization evolved into an authoritarian mechanism to secure 
Qadhafi’s rule.  
As the Libyan economy dropped off in the mid 1980s, and the government was 
less able to distribute patronage; the revolutionary committees became the focus of 
popular resentment. Beginning in 1987, Qadhafi sought to deflect the widespread 
resentment of his security apparatus from his person. He publicly denounced the abuses 
of his revolutionary committees and security organizations. “They have lost their way; 
they have inflicted damage and hurt. A revolutionary should not be an oppressor. I would 
like to be able to show the contrary is true: that the Committees love the masses.”88 Large 
numbers of political prisoners were released. In 1988, Qadhafi personally participated in 
the destruction of the Tripoli’s central prison and supervised the destruction of thousands 
of security files on Libyan citizens.89 Opposition figures were invited to return to Libya. 
Perhaps most dramatic of all, the late 1980s ‘liberalizations’ was the Great Green Charter 
of Human Rights in 1988, which included a ban on capital punishment.90 The fact that his 
domestic liberalization was essentially simultaneous with the 1987 foreign policy 
reversal, suggest that both were largely a response to domestic pressure.  
D.  CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of regime change was clearly a failure and was quickly abandoned. 
The question is whether the policy objective of countering Libya’s militant activism was 
achieved because of U.S. policy instruments. Sanctions that began in 1979 increased until 
economic and diplomatic relations between the United States and Libya were completely 
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cut by 1986. The threat of force also gradually increased until the 1985 U.S. bombing of 
Libyan targets. The pace of terrorist attacks may have slowed in response to the 
accumulating costs of sanctions and the demonstrated willingness of the United States to 
undertake military retaliation against future attacks. However, the combined cost of these 
policy instruments was still not high or sustained enough to stop the practice on their own 
or in combination.  
U.S. policy had a limited effect on Libya’s use of terrorism after 1987, and no 
significant effect on the abandonment of other forms of militancy. Qadhafi’s opposition 
to the West ideologically contributed to his regime’s legitimacy, and the minimal costs of 
unilateral sanctions were far too low to cause him to forego these legitimacy benefits. 
The U.S. raid in 1986 increased the cost of terrorism, but instead of abandoning it, 
Qadhafi focused his efforts on fewer, more damaging acts of terror. Libya’s abandonment 
of other forms of militancy is better explained by the combination of the defeat in Chad, 
and the collapse in the international price of oil that resulted in an increase in domestic 
dissent. If the boom in oil prices provided Qadhafi the means to execute his activist 
foreign policy while meeting his obligations under a rentier social contract, then the 
collapse in oil prices constrained his activism and reduced rentier redistribution, and thus, 
domestic legitimacy. In the end, the 1987 policy reversal was far less affected by U.S. 
policy than by domestic factors. 
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III.  THE LOCKERBIE REVERSAL  
On March 19, 1999, Qadhafi announced that he would allow two Libyan terror 
suspects, Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi and Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah, to be tried by a 
Scottish court created in the Netherlands. The surrender of the two terror suspects is 
generally held as a successful case of multilateral sanctions coercing a policy change.91 
More significantly, it is also held as the first significant step toward normalization with 
the West.92 This chapter explores both claims. First, by analyzing nature of the U.S. 
threat of force and the effects of the multilateral sanctions against Libya in the 1990s, the 
coercive power of these two policy instruments can be gauged. Second, by analyzing the 
changing domestic and international contexts of the 1999 decision, the ideological change 
within the Qadhafi regime can be better understood.  
This chapter finds that although the sanctions were having some effect on the 
Libyan economy, it was not significant enough to coerce an ideological reversal 
independently. Additionally, the threat of internal dissent resulting from a depressed 
economy had already been countered by effective government suppression by the time of 
the 1999 decision. Ultimately, the most effective aspect of the multilateral sanctions was 
international isolation of Libya, and Qadhafi, in particular. As a result of UN sanctions, 
Libya became increasingly isolated diplomatically and economically during the 1990s. 
Ideologically, Qadhafi struggled to reconcile his Pan Arab ambitions, with no support 
from the rest of the Arab world, and the United States dominated New World Order. In 
the end, Qadhafi found a way to free Libya of the UN sanctions while saving face by 
complying with the British and French demands but refusing most of the American 
demands and maintaining a lighter version of his core ideology. Thus, the 1999 policy 
change is best understood as a response to UN diplomatic sanctions rather than a U.S.-
coerced decision or an ideological shift toward the West.  
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A. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: THE MULTILATERAL APPROACH 
The 1999 policy reversal happened in a very different international political 
environment than the 1987 policy change. Qadhafi had lost his largest arms supplier and 
Cold War advocate when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. The Pan Am flight 103 and 
UTA flight 772 bombings in 1988 and 1989, respectively, were the bloodiest acts of 
terrorism in the world prior to 9/11. They galvanized European support for multilateral 
military, diplomatic and economic sanctions against Libya. By 1991, the Bush 
administration had shifted from a policy goal of regime change to a more limited goal of 
policy change.93 This is not to say that the threat of U.S. military force was off the table. 
Absent the Soviet counter-balance, the United States demonstrated a new willingness and 
ability to use military force in the Middle East. The liberation of Kuwait in 1991 also 
demonstrated that some of America’s Cold War adversaries, such as Syria and 
Czechoslovakia, were now willing to join a U.S. led international coalition to enforce 
international law. Operation Desert Shield/Storm was not a direct threat to Libya, but the 
New World Order represented an emerging American leadership in the Middle East and 
growing Libyan isolation worldwide. “The successful U.S. intervention in inter-Arab 
affairs made it clear to Qaddafi that the New World Order was to Tripoli’s detriment.”94  
1. Military Threat 
President George H. W. Bush delivered a speech on August 2, 1990 in which he 
outlined what came to be known as the “Rogue Doctrine.”95 It was the first articulation of 
post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy. The doctrine called for U.S. intervention against 
rogue states that sponsored terrorism, pursued WMD capability, and/or violated the 
human rights of their own people.96 This described Libya, as well as Iraq, whose army 
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was rolling across the Kuwaiti border as the speech was delivered.97 More significantly, 
the Rogue Doctrine was geared toward policy change (or a type B policy objective) rather 
than regime change (or a type C policy objective).98 By early 1991, the Bush 
administration had abandoned the Reagan era covert policy to destabilize the Qadhafi 
regime because of the potentially negative propaganda value.99 Instead of actively 
pursuing regime change in Libya, U.S. policy fell more in-line with European policy 
toward Libya, which had always been a type B policy objective. In October 1991, a 
French magistrate issued an international arrest warrant for the arrest of four Libyan 
agents for their involvement in the 1989 UTA bombing. One month later, in November 
1991, the United States and U.K. governments indicted two Libyan agents for the 1988 
Pan Am flight 103 bombing. This shared grievance against Libyan sponsored terrorism 
forged a coalition within the UN Security Council, which produced resolution 731, 
passed in January 1992. It deplored Libya’s lack of cooperation in both terror 
investigations.100 Libya’s intransigence resulted in Security Council support for 
escalating multilateral sanctions but not escalating military force, as was the case with 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. The early 1990s brought a general international consensus that 
terrorism as a state policy was to be countered through military deterrent and sanctions. 
Gross violations of international borders were to be countered with force. However, 
because of the need to hold a large international coalition together, type B and not type C 
policy objectives were adopted against both Libya and Iraq. From Qadhafi’s perspective, 
Libya risked becoming more isolated for its radical policies but his rule and personal 
survival were less threatened by powers outside of Libya.  
Desert Storm represented a significant change in U.S. policy toward the Middle 
East in both scale, objective and level of commitment. The Reagan administration had 
employed military force in the Middle East on a relatively small scale and only for short 
durations. The U.S. bombing raid on Libya was in support of a policy objective of regime 
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change. However, the limited nature of the attack, like the withdrawal of U.S. 
peacekeepers from Beirut after a suicide bomber attacked their barracks in 1983, 
demonstrated the limited nature of U.S. military commitment in the Middle East.101 The 
forceful U.S. reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait implied an increased U.S. 
willingness to commit forces in the Middle East in the post-Cold War context. Desert 
Shield/Storm was the largest deployment of U.S. military force since Vietnam. After a 
six-month buildup, an international coalition of 737,000 troops (500,000 U.S.), 
comprising over 38 nations, were in the Persian Gulf region ready to use force to liberate 
Kuwait.102 After over a month of air strikes, the ground war only lasted 100 hours. 
Although Desert Storm demonstrated Qadhafi’s potential vulnerability to U.S. power, it 
did not represent an immediate threat. The objective of Desert Storm was the liberation of 
Kuwait, not the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. In the New World Order, as 
long as Qadhafi did not threaten the sovereignty or territorial integrity of other states, he 
was only subject to containment and isolation under the Rogue Doctrine.  
Qadhafi’s response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the U.S. led counter-
offensive demonstrates how little he felt threatened by U.S. force and how much he felt 
threatened by political isolation. He first responded to the unhindered use of U.S. military 
power in anti-imperialist terms. At the outset of the war, he stated, “We wish Iraq to 
triumph and America to be defeated.”103 He saw the war as “an imperialist mission and 
[an expression of] hatred against Arabs.”104 To rid the region of U.S. forces, he proposed 
a Pan Arab alternative (the Libya-PLO105 plan), in which both Iraqi and Western forces 
would be replaced by an Arab-Islamic force in Saudi Arabia and a UN force in Kuwait. 
This plan was ignored at the Arab League summit in August of 1990. Qadhafi tried again, 
alongside Jordan, Sudan and the PLO, to find an Arab solution to the conflict but was 
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again ignored by most of the Arab world.106 Libya’s position began to moderate in 
September 1990 when Qadhafi’s offer of humanitarian aid to Iraq was refused because he 
would not openly support Iraq’s legal claim to Kuwait. After Egyptian President Hosni 
Mubarak warned Qadhafi, in November of 1990, that his explicitly anti-Western stance 
would invite U.S. hostility after the Iraq conflict, Libyan policy went from staunch 
opposition to tentative support for the coalition to liberate Kuwait, including an offer to 
contribute troops to the United Nations’ effort.107 The timing of this reversal, and the 
military and diplomatic events that preceded it, shows that diplomatic isolation, 
especially from the Arab world, and an implied threat of military force, drove the 
decision.  
In sum, although the United States had assumed to demonstrate a more forceful 
role in the Middle East in the 1990s, the military threat to Libya had not increased. It did, 
however, still represent a retaliatory threat for terrorist or WMD initiatives. Bush Sr. and 
Clinton threatened to use force against Libyan WMD facilities in Rabta and Tarhuna, 
respectively.108 However, because regime change was no longer a goal of U.S. policy, 
the threat to the regime was actually decreased. The more significant threat to Qadhafi 
was further isolation and marginalization in the New World Order as the Arab world 
accommodated the West leaving an ideological Libya isolated even in its own 
neighborhood.  
2. Sanctions 
As noted above, the United States had seized all Libyan assets held in the United 
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Table 5.   Sanctions Against Libya 
U.S. Sanctions against Libya 
1978 Ban on military equipment sales to Libya. 
1979 Libya declared a state sponsor of terror as a 
result: 
 1. Controls on exports of dual-use items 
 2. A ban on most economic assistance 
 3. U.S. opposition to loans and aid from 
international institutions 
1981 U.S. passports declared invalid for travel to 
Libya. 
1982 Ban on Libyan crude oil import to the United 
States and of U.S. equipment oil and gas 
equipment to Libya.  
1985 Ban on Libyan refined petroleum products from 
Libya. 
January 1986 Ban on all exports and imports between the 
United States and Libya, Libyan government 
assets in the United States are frozen. 
April 1986 U.S. bomber attack targets near Tripoli and 
Benghazi. 
1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) penalizes 
firms making more than $40 million investment 
in the Libyan energy sector. 
2000 U.S. State Department renews the travel ban on 
Libya. 
2001 ILSA is reauthorized for another five years. 
April 2005 United States announces it will lift U.S. 
sanctions and restore full diplomatic relations. 
May 2006 Libya is removed from the state sponsors of 
terror list. 
September 2006 ILSA renamed ISA because Libya is removed 
from the sanctions act. 
UN and European Sanctions against Libya 
April 1986 European ministers agree to reduce the number 
of Libyan diplomats in Europe and their 
mobility. 
May 1986 G7 leaders vow to fight terrorism and single out 
Libya specifically. 
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UN and European Sanctions against Libya 
January 1992 UN Security Council passes resolution 731, 
which calls for the Libyan government to 
cooperate with the terror investigations into Pan 
Am flight 103 and UTA flight 772. 
March 1992 UN Security Council passes resolution 748, 
which calls for the surrender of suspects in the 
Lockerbie and UTA cases, and threatens an air 
travel ban, arms sales ban and limitation on 
diplomatic personnel at Libyan embassies 
worldwide. 
November 1992 UN Security Council passes resolution 883, 
strengthening the previous resolution, banning 
oil industry equipment and freezing Libyan 
assets. 
August 1998 UN Security Council passes resolution 1192, 
which promises to suspend UN sanctions when 
the two terror suspects are turned over. 
 
UN resolution 748, the first multilateral sanctions, was passed in 1992 with much 
fanfare. At the time, this was hailed as, “the first time in the history of the international 
struggle against modern terrorism that a broad multilateral coalition had succeeded in 
imposing and enforcing effective sanctions against a terrorism-sponsoring state under the 
auspices of the United Nations Security Council.”109 The UN sanctions banned all 
international commercial aviation ties with Libya, imposed an international arms 
embargo, and called on UN member states to ‘significantly reduce’ the number and level 
of staff at Libyan diplomatic missions and to ‘restrict or control the movement’ of all 
such staff who remained.110 The UN sanctions were strengthened in November 1993 with 
resolution 883, which added a worldwide freeze on Libyan assets111 and an embargo on 
export of oil industry equipment to Libya.112 The United States increased the overall 
economic pressure against Libya in 1996 when the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) 
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became law. The U.S. Act sought to isolate Libya further by penalizing foreign 
companies that invested in the United States and invested more than $40 million per year 
in Libyan or Iranian oil and gas industries.113 As part of the Clinton administration’s 
rogue state policy, the ILSA was designed to isolate radical regimes, combat terrorism 
and check the proliferation of WMD.114 Although lawmakers did not explicitly state the 
specific goals of the ILSA at the time, the Act was re-evaluated in response to Libya’s 
1999 reversal, suggesting that it was in part intended to reinforce UN sanctions.  
The effectiveness of the UN sanctions can be judged three ways. First, how much 
of what they set out to achieve was actually achieved. Second, how much of an effect 
they actually had on the Libyan economy and government. Third, how Libya reacted to 
them.  
a. Objectives and Results 
The UN made four demands for the lifting of sanctions: First, cease all 
terrorist activity, including support to the IRA (Irish Republican Army). Second, accept 
responsibility for previous acts of terrorism, including Pan Am flight 103. Third, 
cooperate with ongoing investigations, including handing over the two indicted Pan Am 
suspects and cooperating with French authorities in the matter of the UTA bombing. 
Fourth, pay appropriate compensation for previous acts of terrorism.115 It immediately 
suspended sanctions in 1999 after Libya surrendered the two Pan Am suspects for trial 
and committed to complying with the specific demands of Britain and France with regard 
to support for the IRA and resolution of the UTA bombing, respectively. Qadhafi did not 
accept responsibility for previous acts of terrorism or compensate Pam Am flight 103 
victims, and thus, only complied with two of the four UN demands. As a result, the 
United States maintained its unilateral sanctions. Thus, the United States was, again, the 
only country that imposed significant sanctions and maintained a potential threat of force 
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against Libya. From the European perspective, it can be argued that the multilateral 
sanctions did achieve all of their policy objectives. However, if the UN sanctions are to 
be evaluated according to their stated goals, the 1999 policy reversal only satisfied half of 
the UN demands.  
b.  Economic Costs 
The sanctions were not damaging enough to the Libyan economy to cause 
the 1999 policy reversal by themselves. Several scholars have argued that U.S. sanctions 
on export of oil technology stymied Libya’s mostly American built infrastructure.116 The 
UN sanctions of 1993 also banned the export of oil production equipment to Libya and 
should have had an immediate effect, as spare parts became unavailable. However, oil 
production after 1993 only decreased slightly and then remained relatively constant until 
2003 (Figure 1). O’Sullivan credits the steady level of production to opening new oil 
fields to exploration, with equipment bought on the black market, while production at 
existing fields fell at a rate of 8 percent per year.117 This suggests that, at least in the 
short term, Libya effectively busted the economic sanctions. Surely, the multilateral ban 
on oil technology had some effect on Libyan decision making. However, considering the 
fact that Libya met or exceeded its OPEC production quota every year, the multilateral 
sanctions were, in effect, the limiting factor on production was the quota rather than 
sanctions.118 Also, considering that Libya did not make any concessions to end U.S. 
sanctions, but instead chose to settle with the Europeans alone, the argument that the 
1999 policy change was a result of economic sanctions is not supported by the evidence.  
c.  Diplomatic Costs 
The UN ban on commercial air travel had a greater influence on the policy 
reversal. Qadhafi saw the UN sanctions, in general, and the commercial air travel ban in 
particular, as a product of a U.S., French and British led coalition in the UN Security 
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Council.119 He thus responded by trying to build a coalition of states friendly to himself 
to defy the diplomatic sanctions, first among Arabs, then among Muslims and finally 
among Africans. Libyan Foreign Minister Omar Mustafa Al-Muntasser denounced the 
sanctions as a “crusade against Arabs and Muslims.”120 On April 19, 1995, a Libyan 
commercial airliner flew from Tripoli to Saudi Arabia in violation of the UN sanctions, 
carrying pilgrims on the hajj. The UN sanctions committee met, at Egypt’s request, and 
granted Libyan pilgrims permission to travel to Mecca from Libya, but only on Egyptian 
aircraft.121 This compromise allowed 8,000 pilgrims to travel from Libya to Mecca in the 
rest of 1995. Qadhafi portrayed the compromise as a great anti-imperialist victory. “No 
American can prevent us from reaching Mecca, even if we have to do it by swimming 
there in a sea of blood.”122 The next year he refused to use Egyptian aircraft for flights to 
Mecca, seeking to force further concessions from the (United Nations). However, in the 
end, Qadhafi’s diplomatic sanctions busting effort did not rally significant support from 
other Arab states, which generally complied with UN sanctions. After more than two 
decades of attempting to build a Pan Arab coalition against the West (Table 6), the Arab 
world’s neutral response to the international sanctions of 1992 was the last straw for 
Qadhafi. 
We sacrificed everything [for them], even our children’s bread…We 
exhausted our economy for their sake. [Now] the fig leaf has been dropped 
and everything has been laid bare: The Arabs are these days reserves for 
the [U.S.] Marines…It would not be surprising if [the Arabs] were 
overcome with joy listening to the [Security Council sanctions] 
resolutions.123 
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Table 6.   Libya’s Agreements124 
Libya’s Regional Unification Agreements: 1969-1990 
1969 Egypt/Sudan/Libya (Tripoli Carter) 
1971 Egypt/Syria/Libya (Benghazi Treaty) 
1972 Egypt/Libya 
1973 Algeria/Libya (Hassi Messaoud Accords) 
1974 Tunisia/Libya (Djerba Treaty) 
1981 Chad/Libya (Tripoli Communiqué) 
1984–86 Morocco/Libya (Oujda Treaty) 
1987 Algeria/Libya 
1990 Sudan/Libya 
Libyan Cooperation Agreements 
1977 Ethiopia/Libya (economic and technical cooperation agreement) 
1980 Chad/Libya (mutual defense accords) 
1981 Ethiopia/South Yemen/Libya (military cooperation, Aden 
Treaty) 
1981–86 Burundi/BurkinaFaso/Seychelles/Zimbabwe/Ghana/Sudan/Moza
mbique/CAR/Uganda/Malta/Djibouti/Togo (bilateral military 
and/or cultural cooperation agreements)  
 
Sub-Saharan African countries were more receptive to Qadhafi’s calls to 
defy UN sanctions. Qadhafi portrayed himself as “a beleaguered revolutionary, standing 
firm against the forces of imperialism and neo-colonialism.”125 The Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) was the only regional organization to defy the UN ban on 
commercial air travel to and from Libya.126 Having received more diplomatic support 
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‘mirage’ and that, “Africans and not Arabs are Libya’s real supporters.”127 In March 
1999, he announced, “I have no time to lose talking with Arabs…I now talk about Pan-
Africanism and African unity.”128  
The persistence with which Qadhafi attempted to defy the UN travel ban 
shows that resisting political isolation was a significant motivating factor in his decision 
making process. His behavior after UN sanctions were lifted reinforces this conclusion. 
He invited a procession of African heads of state to Tripoli to pay their respects and to 
attend his announcement of several diplomatic initiatives. He portrayed himself as an 
African elder statesman, attempting to resolve disputes in Congo, the Horn of Africa, 
Sierra Leone and Sudan.129 He brokered a cease-fire between Congo and Uganda in April 
1999 and later hosted a five-nation summit on Congo.130 His larger political ambitions in 
Africa included creation of a United States of Africa, a goal long shared (if only 
rhetorically) by African states.131 In sum, Qadhafi sought to create a new and prominent 
role for himself and his country in the New World Order. Arab indifference to the UN 
sanctions and reliance on U.S. military leadership after 1991 convinced Qadhafi that 
there was no such role for him among Arab states. If he were going to forge a new 
international leadership role for himself, it would require an end to political isolation, 
specifically an end to the UN flight ban.  
B. ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS 
Domestic factors help explain why Qadhafi took seven years to comply with the 
European demands contained in the UN sanctions even if he had largely abandoned the 
Pan Arab goal years before 1999. Actually, Qadhafi was not secure enough domestically 
to abandon his protection of Libyan terrorists in the years immediately after the 
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imposition of multilateral sanctions. “The decade and a half between 1986 and the end of 
the century represented the most difficult years the regime ever faced.”132 Internal threats 
came from increasing resentment of the ubiquitous revolutionary committees, a 
demoralized and rebellious military, and newly mobilized Islamist groups, all of which 
was catalyzed by the decline in the international price of oil, and thus, of patronage 
resources. Qadhafi’s response was to ethnicize the armed forces to shore up loyalty there, 
suppress Islamists insurgents brutally, and diffuse popular dissent by promising political 
and economic liberalization. He also insulated himself behind new layers of security, 
while fragmenting adversaries within the regime. By 1999, he had suppressed the most 
dangerous domestic threats to his regime, and cleared the way to make the unpopular 
decision to comply with some of the UN demands.  
Defeat in Chad, international weapons sanctions and a stagnant economy all 
combined to make the Libyan military even more of a potential threat to the Qadhafi 
government in the 1990s. His response was to fragment the military and to create 
additional, more loyal, security organizations. Qadhafi sought to bypass both the military 
and tribal leaders historically considered protectors of the Libyan government by 
distributing economic resources directly to local figures, thus constructing a new set of 
patrimonial networks. In 1991, the Ministry of Defense was abolished. By 1995, Qadhafi 
declared the army dissolved, putting in its place popular militias, which were supposed to 
defend the nation against all forms of aggression.133 Libya was divided into 1,500 
communes, each a self-governing mini-replica of the larger state, and each responsible 
for its own defense.134 The local leaders and their militias were largely ineffective, but 
the change in patronage distribution succeeded in undermining both military and 
traditional tribal distribution streams.135 Resentment against this new patronage 
arraignment took the form of several serious coup attempts beginning in 1992.136 In 
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1993, a group of captains from the Warfalla tribe led a coup attempt as an expression of 
military and tribal resentment.137 Despite the execution of six generals and arrest of 1,500 
people after the 1993 attempt,138 by 1998 coup plots and assassination attempts measured 
in the dozens.139 Qadhafi responded by building new layers of security around himself. 
Eastern European mercenaries were widely employed. Revolutionary committees within 
the military were given back their arbitrary power to ensure loyalty. At the end of the 
1980s, the Revolutionary Guard only measured 2,000. After the mid 1990s, the 
Revolutionary Guard had grown to 40,000 and was the most trusted military force by the 
government.140 Some observers at the time described the growing numbers of individuals 
with more loyal tribal affiliations obtaining high rank in the nation’s security 
organizations as the “re-tribalization” of Libya.141 In the end, the military and traditional 
tribal threats to the regime had been repressed or fragmented by 1999, giving Qadhafi the 
security he needed to undertake the rapprochement with the West that he desired.  
The early 1990s also saw the return of mujahidin who had fought the Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan. These ‘Afghan Arabs’ posed a threat to the regime. The 
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), which trained in Afghanistan, began to confront 
the regime openly in 1995. The Islamist violence escalated in the late 1990s, especially 
after a prison uprising allowed 400 mostly Islamist prisoners to escape.142 Islamists 
undertook an assassination attempt on Qadhafi in March 1996.143 However, the Islamist 
threat in Libya was less coordinated and less effective than in other Arab countries at this 
time, such as Algeria. The Islamists were suppressed with a combination of  
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Revolutionary Guards, local militias and mercenaries from the former Soviet Union and 
Cuba. By 1999, armed resistance had “dwindled to the odd shootout between policemen 
and diehard insurgents hiding in the hills.”144  
At the same time that the rebellious military, tribes and Islamist were being 
repressed, the limited political and economic liberalizations of the late 1980s were 
reducing popular dissent.145 In 1988, the Great Green Charter of Human Rights codified 
several laws and punishments in reaction to popular resentment against security forces 
and police excesses. In 1989, a new Ministry of Justice was created.146 The objective of 
the economic liberalizations was to increase the size of the private sector (at this time 70 
to 75 percent of employees worked for the state) and reduce government spending, 
especially on subsidies to publicly owned corporations.147 The ban on private retail trade 
was lifted in 1987. A year later, the state’s monopoly on imports and exports was 
abandoned.148 Economic liberalization did not include privatization of the oil sector, and 
thus, did not further threaten the regime’s distributive networks. Real liberalization would 
have threatened the regime’s survival, and was thus not pursued, but the “subterfuge” 
succeeded in shoring up the regime.149  
By 1999, Qadhafi was secure enough to prepare the population for the decision to 
comply with some of the UN demands. The balance of power within the regime between 
hard-liners, led mostly by members of the revolutionary committees, and the pragmatists, 
led by Libya’s Energy Minister, Abdallah Salim al-Badri and Foreign Minister, Omar 
Mustafa al-Muntasser, was tipping toward the pragmatists.150 Just before the terror 
suspects were handed over for trial, a series of articles in the state-owned Al-Jamajiriya 
criticized the intransigence of the hard-liners and “their inability to recognize prevailing 
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global realities.”151 Qadhafi himself announced, “we cannot stand in the way of 
progress…The fashion now is the free market and investments.”152 Yet, when he 
announced the two terror suspects would be remanded for trial, he could not resist the 
urge to spin the decision in anti-Imperialist rhetoric. Qadhafi boasted that the United 
States and Britain had suffered a “historic defeat” and that “I do not want a pardon from 
America. On the contrary, it is an honor for me to stay on the US blacklist forever.”153 
Clearly, Qadhafi still felt the need to appease more ideological interest groups inside 
Libya. Internationally, Libya expressed the hope that the compromise would lead to a 
“new opportunity for forging equitable relations…, based upon mutual respect and 
noninterference in Libya’s internal affairs.”154 The divergence in rhetoric shows that 
Qadhafi was concerned with the domestic reaction to this ideological reversal, but 
interested in ending his long standoff with the West.  
C. CONCLUSION  
Qadhafi’s decision to comply with the European demands and surrender the two 
suspects was affected by a combination of factors. Economic sanctions alone were not 
effective enough to coerce an ideological reversal. Nor was the threat of military force. 
The air travel ban had the greatest impact on Qadhafi’s personal ambitions, and therefore, 
received the most reaction from the Libyan government. Like the 1987 reversal, and 
despite the claims of political leaders at the time, Qadhafi’s decision was more influenced 
by macro-economic and international geopolitical changes. In the context of the end of 
the Cold War, the failure of any Arab cooperative politics and the rise of U.S. military 
dominance and political leadership in the Middle East, political isolation was the most 
compelling instrument employed against Qadhafi. The 1999 reversal happened seven 
years after the UN sanctions took effect only because it took that long for the Qadhafi 
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regime to suppress the domestic threats emerging from the military defeat in Chad, the 
collapse in oil prices, the rise of the Islamists returning from Afghanistan, and to build an 
alternate, Pan-African, coalition behind his coveted international leadership role.  
 46
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IV.  THE 2003 ‘CONVERSION’155 
The trend that began when the Soviet Union collapsed became more unilaterally 
U.S. driven after September 11, 2001. The right side and the rogue side, as defined by the 
United States, would morph into an ‘axis of evil’ and ‘you’re either with us or against 
us.’ Libya had successfully divided the opposition in the UN Security Council in 1999, 
but two years later, the Bush doctrine would threaten to put Libya back on the isolated 
side of history. The December 19, 2003 announcement that Libya would abandon the 
pursuit of WMD and renounce terrorism came as economic and diplomatic conditions 
were improving. “A leading Arab source dubbed the Libyan move ‘the mother of all 
surprises,’ ironically echoing Saddam Hussein. Other Arab sources referred to the ‘bomb 
of renunciation of the dream of the bomb.’”156 Why did Libya make this final and 
complete policy reversal when its diplomatic and economic isolation was already ending? 
Of the three instruments of U.S. foreign policy, only the threat of military force was 
increasing during the period leading up to the 2003 reversal. However, this increased 
‘coercive credibility’ was not significant enough to compel a complete capitulation to all 
U.S. demands. This chapter shows that the 2003 reversal was a continuation of the 
Libyan policy change that began in 1998. The “conversion” of Libya from an anti-
Western state bent on developing WMD to a partner against terrorism and a model for 
non-proliferation is also the story of the victory of the pragmatic faction within the 
Libyan government over the ideological faction. The fear of being defined a rogue state, 
outside the normal international family of nations, motivated Libya to reverse policy in 
1999 only grew more powerful in the years leading up to 2003, and helped tip the scales 
in favor of the pragmatic “conversion.” September 11, and the resulting U.S. political and 
military activism in the Middle East, also made a WMD program a security liability 
rather than a deterrent, further reducing the ideological faction’s influence. Qadhafi’s 
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personal ideology had changed from Pan-Arabism to Pan-Africanism in the late 1990s 
providing a forum for the ideological faction’s anti-Western policies and rhetoric. 
However, unlike Pan Arabism, Pan Africanism was not as widely supported.157 In the 
end, the “conversion” was more a result of failed and unpopular ideological policies and 
larger geopolitical and macro-economic trends than of U.S. coercion. U.S. policy 
magnified the forces already working against the ideological faction’s policies and helped 
tip the scale in favor of the pragmatic faction.  
After 1999, Qadhafi’s quest for a new leadership role in Africa changed from a 
means to end UN sanctions to a central ideological tenant of Libyan policy. African 
leaders served Qadhafi well during the UN sanctions. Qadhafi repaid this support with an 
ambitious Pan-African agenda. Only months after the UN sanctions were suspended, 
Qadhafi personally led the effort to reform the OAU according to his own designs. He 
hosted a special summit in Sirte, Libya, to amend the OAU charter, which was attended 
by 45 African leaders at a cost to Libya of $45 million.158 Although the summit did not 
completely endorse Qadhafi’s vision of African unity embodied in a ‘United States of 
Africa,’ the Sirte Declaration called for the creation of several Pan-African 
institutions.159 The following year’s OAU summit in Lome, Togo, in February 2000, won 
a majority decision to replace the OAU with the African Union (AU) within one year, 
which was accomplished on March 26, 2001, largely due to Qadhafi’s efforts and 
sponsorship.160 Qadhafi’s efforts were not only successful because of his generous 
checkbook diplomacy. Libyan leadership in Africa was far less threatening than it had 
been in the previous decades. Unlike the revolutionary policies of the 1970s and early 
1980s, Libyan leadership in Africa after 1999 depended on cooperation. Qadhafi himself 
signaled this less confrontational shift as early as 1998. “In the era of national liberation,  
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I struggled alongside Angola, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia, Guinea-Bissau, Cape 
Verde, Algeria, Palestine…But today, we can throw away our guns and work for peace 
and development. This is my role. War has had its day.”161 
Ironically, while Qadhafi was winning African support for the new AU, African 
immigrants in Libya were suffering unprecedented abuse. Sub-Saharan migrants had 
been arriving in Libya in large numbers since the 1990s, most intending to reach Europe. 
However, many stayed in Libya. Libyan cities also attracted large populations of sub-
Saharan migrants because of ‘open border’ policies and relaxed work visa requirements 
in the name of Pan African unity.162 By 2000, Libyan officials acknowledged that 
Libya’s population of 5 million Libyan consisted of 1.4 million black Africans.163 Self 
identified Arab Libyans tended to blame African migrants for crime, unemployment, 
poverty and AIDS.164 In late September 2000, anti-immigrant riots in a town just west of 
Tripoli resulted in the deaths of between 150 and 500.165 Libya quietly deported many 
African migrants while maintaining pro-migrant policies in an attempt to quell domestic 
resentment while maintaining African support for Libya’s Pan African leadership role.166 
Many Libyans came to resent the Qadhafi’s Pan African policies and feared that Libyan 
foreign policy would, once again, lead the nation to financial ruin. “Tripolitans curse the 
opening of the borders, which has turned them into a minority in their own capital. This 
serves as yet another manifestation of the almost ‘one-man show’ that is Libyan foreign 
policy…”167 During the 1990s, Pan African, and anti-Western, rhetoric served the 
specific policy goal of ending UN sanctions. After 1999, it only seemed to serve 
Qadhafi’s ego, further reducing the ideological faction’s influence. September 11, 2001, 
and the resulting Bush Doctrine, would further reduce the attractiveness of ideological 
                                                 
161 Interview with Qadhafi, L’Autre Afrique, March 18, 1998.  
162 Ronen, Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics, 192. 
163 Radio Tripoli, October 9, 2000 (BBC), Ronen, Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics, 199. 
164 Martinez, The Libyan Paradox, 111. 
165 Yehudit Ronen, “A Libyan-Italian Encounter: The Changing Mosaic of Mediterranean Migration,” 
Maghreb Review 33 (2008): 69–81.  
166 Ronen, Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics, 192. 
167 Solomon and Swart, “Libyan Foreign Policy in Flux,” 481. 
 50
policies. Conversely, the improving economy, mostly due to higher oil prices and 
improved economic relations with European countries, strengthened the pragmatic 
faction’s influence, eventually producing the 2003 ‘conversion.’  
A. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
1. The End of Multilateral Sanctions 
Despite the claims of several scholars to the contrary, sanctions had little to do 
with the 2003 reversal.168 International support for the isolation of Libya had evaporated 
in 1999. U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert L. Neumann noted in July 1999:  
Much of the world has been quick to welcome Libya back into the 
community of nations. On the political front, a number of nations have re-
established diplomatic relations, and Libya has become much more active 
in regional organizations. On the economic front, immediately following 
the suspension of UN sanctions proscribing direct air travel to and from 
Libya, foreign airlines opened direct routes to Tripoli. Foreign firms have 
also welcomed Libya’s indications of interest in large infrastructure 
projects, including in the petroleum sector and aircraft purchases.169 
After 1999, the United States was the alone in attempting to isolate Libya, and thus 
almost by definition, ineffective. The suspended UN sanctions stood little chance of 
being reinstated after Europe had reengaged Libya economically and diplomatically.  
Economic explanations also ring hollow because the Libyan economy improved 
dramatically after 1999, primarily due to the surging international price of oil (Figure 2). 
After years of stagnation, economic growth turned robust, inflation subsided and reserves 
of international currencies grew.170 The economy grew from $5.9 billion in 1998 to $13.4 
billion in 2003.171 The suspension of UN sanctions in 1999 opened the door for foreign 
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oil companies to re-enter Libya, and in 2000, 2001 and 2002, international oil and gas 
executives ranked Libya as the top exploration spot in the world.172 Britain was quick to 
normalize economic and diplomatic relations in 1999 followed by other European 
countries (Tables 7 and 8).173 The influence of U.S. economic sanctions alone was not 
significant enough to have coerced the 2003 reversal.  
 
Table 7.   European Rapprochement Timelines 
French and German-Libyan Rapprochement Timeline 
August 2003 Libya formally accepts responsibility for bombing Pan Am 
flight 103 and pay $2.7 billion to the families of the 
victims. 
September 2003 UN Security Council votes 13–0174 to remove economic 
sanctions.  
January 2004 Libya agrees to pay $170 million to the 170 families of the 
UTA flight 772 bombing as a humanitarian gesture.175 
February 2004 France calls for ‘progressive normalization’ between Libya 
and the EU.176 
September 2004 Libya pays $35 million in compensation to families of the 
Berlin Disco bombing in 1986.177 
October 2004 E.U. lifts arms embargo against Libya. German and French 
Prime Ministers visit Libya.178 
British-Libyan Rapprochement Timeline 
November 1999 Libya accepts ‘general responsibility’ for the murder of 
British policewoman Yvonne Fletcher and paid an 
undisclosed compensation to her family.179 
December 1999 Britain normalized diplomatic relations with Libya. British 
companies return to Libya. British Airways flies scheduled 
flights to Tripoli.180 
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British-Libyan Rapprochement Timeline 
January 2003 Libya voted chairman of the UN Human Rights 
Commission over U.S. objections.181 
August 2003 Libya formally accepts responsibility for bombing Pan Am 
flight 103 and pay $2.7 billion to the families of the 
victims. 
September 2003 UN Security Council votes 13–0182 to remove economic 
sanctions. 
March 2004 Prime Minister Tony Blair visits Qadhafi in Libya. 
 
Table 8.   U.S.-Libyan Rapprochement Timeline: 
June 1999 Following the Lockerbie surrender, U.S. and Libyan 
officials meet for the first time in 18 years to discuss UN 
sanctions.183 
August 2001 ILSA extended for another five years because of 
outstanding U.S./UN demands. 
January 2003  United States renews unilateral sanctions against Libya for 
the seventeenth consecutive year.184 
August 2003 Libya formally accepts responsibility for bombing Pan Am 
flight 103 and pay $2.7 billion to the families of the victims. 
September 2003 UN Security Council votes 13-0185 to remove economic 
sanctions. 
December 2003 Libya announces it will surrender its WMD program. 
February 2004  United States lifts travel ban to Libya. 
March 2004 U.S. Congressional delegation visits Tripoli.186 
April 2004 United States lifts ILSA. Only a ban on military sales, direct 
flights and continued freeze of Libyan assets held in the 
United States remain in effect.187 
June 2004  United States opens a Liaison Office in Tripoli.188 
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September 2004 United States lifts trade and transportation sanctions, 
unfreezing $1.3 billion Libyan assets held in the United 
States189 
May 2006 ‘Full and Complete’ diplomatic relations restored.190 
June 2006 Libya removed from the state sponsors of terrorism list, 
removing the last U.S. sanctions.191  
December 2008 U.S. ambassador arrives in Libya after 36-year absence.192 
2. Diplomacy and Negotiations 
Several scholars and diplomats credit the 2003 conversion to U.S./British 
negotiations with Libya that began after the 1999 Lockerbie compromise. According to 
St Johns, “Libya was a win, not for a strategy of preemptive strikes, but for a policy of 
engagement, supported by persistent, patient diplomacy.”193 U.S. Assistant Secretary of 
State Martin Indyk, who led the secret talks with Libya between 1999 and 2000, U.S. 
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and British Prime Minister Tony Blair make 
similar contentions.194 The argument that diplomacy was the decisive factor in the 2003 
reversal is based largely on timing.195 According to Ronen, “Libyan leaders claimed that 
although it was announced only at the end of 2003, the decision had been made nine 
months earlier during secret trilateral negotiations among Washington, London, and 
Tripoli. The ‘Iraqi effect’ was thus entirely ‘irrelevant’…”196 However, whenever in 
2003 the decision was made, no evidence exists that the U.S./British bargaining position 
changed. Nevertheless, the ‘grand bargain’ explanation assumes that an acceptable 
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‘reciprocal’197 arrangement was agreed upon after prolonged secret negotiations. Flynt 
Leverett contends that there was an explicit quid pro quo: In exchange for Libya 
dismantling its WMD program, the United States would lift sanctions by the end of 
2004.198 However, the evidence suggests that unlike the agreement reached with the UN 
in 1999, the 2003 reversal was not met with an immediate or reciprocal response. The 
fact that the United States was slower to lift sanctions and normalize relations than 
European countries or the UN suggests that there was in fact no ‘grand bargain.’ It took 
four months for the United States  to suspend the ILSA and two and a half years to end 
sanctions against Libya completely (Table 8). In 2009, Qadhafi himself stated that Libya 
was not compensated for its 2003 reversal: “Regrettably, Libya did not benefit from this 
historic action that it took in the service of world peace. Libya was not rewarded for this 
historic action that was done. I would say Libya benefited, but was not rewarded.”199 The 
slow U.S. response and Qadhafi’s statement suggest that Libya was not responding to a 
new offer on the table but rather that it was responding to other factors.  
B.  ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS  
By the time of the 1999 reversal, the Qadhafi government had already 
successfully repressed most domestic opposition, making it more secure than it had been 
for most of the 1990s.200 Qadhafi had also successfully insulated himself behind 
concentric rings of loyal security forces. The military had been fragmented to the point 
that it no longer posed a significant threat to the regime. The Islamists were defeated. In 
addition, the economy was improving, mostly because of a surging international oil price. 
Free from these domestic constraints, the Qadhafi government could make policy without 
fear of domestic repercussions. This newly regained regime security also brought about 
an internal debate as to the direction of the government, post UN sanctions.  
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After the 1999 Lockerbie compromise, the Qadhafi government was still divided 
into two factions. The pragmatists, given voice by Qadhafi’s son Seif al-Islam, pushed to 
settle all differences with the West, and with the U.S. specifically, to normalized 
diplomatic relations and modernize the Libyan economy. The ideologues, led by many of 
the original ‘revolutionaries,’ pressed for continued opposition to the West, or at least, the 
United States.  However, their position was undermined by Qadhafi’s abandonment of 
the original ‘revolutionary’ ideology in favor of a less confrontational Pan-Africanism.201 
The WMD program was central long-standing goal of the ideological faction. Both 
factions had enough influence to initiate policy between 1999 and 2003, and a mix of 
ideology and pragmatism so animated Libyan foreign policy in these years: the 
pragmatists were attempting to normalize economically and diplomatically with the West 
while the ideologues were pressing ahead with the clandestine WMD program. “Even as 
Libya intensified its efforts to move closer to the West, it had from the mid-1990s been 
undertaking serious…efforts to acquire nuclear technology. According to a senior U.S. 
official, procurement accelerated after the suspension of the United Nations sanctions in 
1999.”202 The 9/11 attack, and the resulting Bush Doctrine, made the pragmatists’ 
normalization agenda more urgent, and the ideologues’ agenda more dangerous, by 
converting the WMD program from a security guarantee to a security risk. Despite 
Qadhafi’s face-saving anti-Western rhetoric at the AU and UN, the 2003 conversion 
marked the victory of the pragmatic faction inside the Libyan government. 
C.  GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT 
WMD initially made strategic sense to the Qadhafi regime in three ways. First, 
WMD would help Libya’s small population secure its large, potentially valuable, 
territory.203 Second, WMD could not be used against the regime by a potentially 
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rebellious military, unlike most other weapon systems.204 Third, WMD would be a 
powerful deterrent against another U.S. attack. The New World Order and 9/11 changed 
this security calculation. The potential threat of Algerian or Egyptian claims205 on Libyan 
territory were less likely after Operation Desert Shield/Storm had demonstrated the 
international consensus for upholding international law, especially with respect to 
international borders. In addition, the development of complex weapons systems had 
proven more costly and controversial than anticipated by Libyan decision makers.206 
Lastly, and most significantly with regard to the timing of the 2003 conversion, under the 
Bush Doctrine, the United States became willing to commit U.S. forces against 
governments that sought to acquire WMD. The deterrent benefit of WMD had turned into 
a security risk.  
The September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks and consequent Bush Doctrine 
changed the nature of the external threat, as well as the value of WMD. The risk of a 
unilateral U.S. imposed regime change increased. Previously, the use of U.S. military 
force was limited to tit-for-tat strikes against supporters of terrorism207 and sustained 
economic sanctions. However, these were instruments intended to produce a policy 
change. The ‘War on Terror’ introduced a credible existential and sustained threat. 
Although Libya was not specifically included in the ‘Axis of Evil’ identified by President 
Bush in January 2002, Under-Secretary of State John Bolton identified it as an additional 
“rogue state” intent on acquiring WMD.208 “The Libyan leadership had the feeling that 
the Bush administration’s justification for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein could be 
applied equally to Libya: namely that Libya was developing a nuclear and chemical 
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weapons program, that Libya was a terrorist state, headed by an anti-Israeli dictator.”209 
World events indirectly increased U.S. enmity toward Libya. The end of the Cold War 
left it a ‘rogue state’ in the New World Order, and 9/11 pushed it toward the ‘axis of 
evil.’ This increasing threat tipped the balance of power among Libyan policymaking 
factions toward the pragmatists.  
The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq tipped the balance further. U.S. willingness to act 
with a small coalition, and without UN approval, increased the potential threat to Libya. 
The Taliban was overthrown by an ‘alliance’ of Afghan tribes, with the help of NATO 
airpower, and the approval of the UN. This was not a significant change to the 
international status quo. It was understood after 9/11 that overt acts of terrorism would 
invite international support for military retaliation. However, the U.S. invasion of Iraq 
demonstrated that no longer was a ‘smoking gun’ or widespread international support 
required for the United States to use decisive force. Despite the claims of Libyan 
diplomats to the contrary, the invasion of Iraq accelerated rapprochement with the West. 
“Some Arabs who were in regular conversations with Libyan officials say the regime was 
increasingly desperate to secure a deal as the war in Iraq loomed, worried that ‘it would 
be next’ in some unspecified way.”210 In September 2003, Qadhafi told Italy’s Prime 
Minister Silvio Berlusconi, “I will do whatever the Americans want, because I saw what 
happened in Iraq, and I was afraid.”211 Also, the relatively quick capture of Baghdad 
ended any illusion that Arab states, individually or collectively, could defend their 
homelands. Even though the Iraqis were countering an invasion of their homeland in 
2003 and ground fighting lasted much longer than in the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the 
intensity of the resistance in OIF (as measured by the number of troops killed per days of 
ground combat) was weaker than in 1991.212 Despite the existential nature of threat, it 
took only 21 days for U.S. forces to take Baghdad. Tripoli would be much easier to 
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capture given its coastal location. In sum, the new policy objective and commitment to 
the use of military force must have weighed heavily in Qadhafi’s decision-making 
process after 2001. However, because Libya was not explicitly targeted by the Bush 
Doctrine, the influence accelerated the pace of the already ongoing ‘conversion’ rather 
than caused it.  
D.  CONCLUSION 
The pragmatic faction within the Qadhafi government had already made the 
strategic decision to reengage with Europe, and had significant policymaking influence, 
when Libya turned the Lockerbie bombers over in 1999. Yet, the ideological faction still 
had enough influence at that time to resist the specific U.S. demands. In effect, the 1999 
decision can be viewed as a compromise between pragmatic and ideological factions, 
showing a balance of power between then prevailed at the time; pragmatic toward Europe 
while remaining ideological toward the United States. The 2003 acceptance of all U.S. 
demands marked the end of the ideological faction’s foreign policy influence. The WMD 
program represented a core policy goal of the ‘revolutionaries.’ Libyans’ generally 
xenophobic reaction to sub-Saharan migrants betrayed the thin commitment to Pan 
African unity. At the same time, the ideological faction was being discredited internally, 
9/11 and the quick U.S. led regime change in Iraq made continued opposition to the U.S. 
a riskier proposition. In the years leading up to the 2003 decision, the ideological faction 
had lost credibility domestically and was seen as increasingly dangerous in the new 
international environment. Additionally, the pragmatic faction’s economic and diplomatic 
success reengaging Europe provided a tangible incentive to continued pragmatic policies. 
In the end, the instruments of U.S. policy were not influential enough by themselves to 
cause the 2003 conversion. The larger international and domestic Libyan contexts played 
a much greater role than any specific U.S. policy instrument. This is not to say that a 
credible threat of force, diplomacy or sanctions were irrelevant. U.S. policy was most 
effective when it helped the pragmatic faction within the Libyan government seem the 
more credible policy choice. The increasing ‘coercive credibility’ following 9/11 and the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq supported pragmatic Libyan policymaking. The economic and 
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diplomatic benefits of reconciliation with Europe also supported the pragmatic faction’s 
policies. The conversion was complete when the pragmatic faction was influential 
enough to surrender one of the core policy goals of the ‘revolutionaries,’ the WMD 
program, and consign ideology to empty official rhetoric. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This work began by asking one simple question: What explains the Libyan 
reversal after decades of resistance? The answer is not as simple as some have argued. 
The within case comparison method employed in this thesis was useful for two reasons. 
Primarily, it put U.S. policy factors into proper context, rather than focusing narrowly 
upon them as the only possible driving forces in the conversion. Many politicians and 
some scholars have claimed that one particular policy instrument was essential in forcing 
Libyan reversals, and several correlations seem to support their specific claims. Libya 
stopped most militant activism after the 1986 U.S. bombing raid, and therefore, U.S. 
military power was decisive in the 1987 reversal. The two Lockerbie suspects were 
surrendered with the explicit promise that UN sanctions would be suspended, and 
therefore, the multilateral sanctions were decisive in the 1999 reversal. The Libyan WMD 
program was the subject of negotiations for months before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and 
therefore, the negotiations and diplomatic engagement were the decisive ingredient in the 
2003 reversal. However, none of these correlations was in fact causal. In fact, when 
considered in the larger context of the changing domestic and international scenes of the 
1980s and 1990s, it becomes obvious that U.S. policy instruments were not the singular 
cause that some claim. Only when domestic and international antecedent conditions are 
taken into account can the influence of U.S. policy can be evaluated.  
The second reason the within case comparison proved useful is that it reduced the 
number of variables at play, while allowing for variation in the values of those that 
remain. The Qadhafi government has survived since 1969. To this day, Qadhafi and his 
close confidants retain complete control over the important policy decisions of the 
country. The examination of why the same decision makers made different decisions 
when faced with similar U.S. policy instruments, allowed for a complete and balanced 
analysis. If the use of military force and sanctions in 1987 did not coerce an abandonment 
of the WMD program then, why did continuing unilateral sanctions and the perceived 
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threat of force cause the complete abandonment in 2003? The obvious answer is that 
antecedent conditions had changed, both domestically and internationally. A decision that 
made sense in the Cold War no longer made sense after 9/11. The within case comparison 
helps draw out the contextual differences between previous policy reversals and the 
influence of specific U.S. policy instruments.  
The first significant Libyan policy reversal examined in this thesis occurred in 
1987. It marked the end of most forms of Libyan militant activism. Years of Libyan 
belligerence resulted in increasing U.S. sanctions and military confrontation, which 
culminated in the complete severing of U.S. economic and diplomatic relations and the 
U.S. bombing raid in 1986. One year later, Libya had stopped almost all aspects of its 
militant activism. At the time, U.S. politicians credited Libya quiescence to effective U.S. 
policy. The timing of a culminating U.S. policy of coercion and the Libyan reversal 
seemed to support their claim. However, other events were more influential than U.S. 
policy. The Libyan military was demoralized by a crushing defeat in Chad in 1987. It is 
doubtful that the Libyan military had the will or capability to sustain military operations 
in any theater outside Libya immediately after 1987. Additionally, the influence of 
unilateral U.S. sanctions was largely offset with European oil consumers and was 
dwarfed in influence by the collapse of the international price of oil. Despite increasing 
U.S. sanctions, macro-economic conditions greatly inhibited Libya’s ability to conduct its 
expansionist and belligerent foreign policy. There is no doubt that U.S. policy increased 
the price of Libyan sponsorship of terrorism. However, the domestic context of a 
defeated military and the international context of crashing oil prices were more 
significant factors than U.S. policy in the 1987 reversal.  
The second Libyan policy reversal was the 1999 surrender of the Lockerbie 
bombing suspects. At the time, it was hailed as a successful example of U.S. and UN 
coercive policy. Again, because the UN sanctions did not limit Libyan oil exports, the 
direct impact on the Libyan economy was not enough to coerce an ideological shift. 
However, the end of the Cold War and the New World Order changed the security 
calculus of the Libyan government. After the loss of the Soviet arms supplier and the 
potential political cover provided during the Cold War, Libya was more easily isolated 
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for its use of terrorism. Additionally, in the post-Cold War context of the years leading up 
to the 1999 compromise, the Libyan government was beginning to split into two factions. 
One faction pressed to normalize diplomatic and economic relations with the West, while 
the other continued to define itself in ideological opposition to the West. The decision to 
surrender the Lockerbie suspects would be the first major policy decision in which the 
pragmatic faction held sway over Qadhafi’s final decision. That said, the 1999 decision is 
not a complete shift toward the West or away from anti-Western ideology. The decision 
to spit the UN coalition against Libya by accepting European demands while continuing 
to resist many key U.S. demands, likely showed the continuing influence of the 
ideologues. In addition, even with the explicit quid pro quo offer of ending UN sanctions 
on the table, it was only after the domestic threats to Qadhafi’s government, and himself, 
were neutralized that he felt secure enough to accept the European aspects of the UN 
demands. Clearly, the domestic and international contexts of the 1999 decision played a 
more influential role than specific U.S. policy instruments.  
The pragmatic faction within the Libyan government became more influential 
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, eventually producing the 2003 conversion, as Qadhafi 
himself looked for a face-saving way to end Libya’s, and his, isolation. The Bush 
Doctrine accelerated, but did not cause, Libyan acceptance of U.S. demands to accept 
responsibility for previous acts of terrorism, compensate victims and finally to abandon 
the WMD program. Even when U.S. policy instruments are analyzed according to the 
policy objective, level of threat, effectiveness of sanctions and proportionality and 
reciprocity of negotiated settlements, none alone can account for such a complete 
capitulation. Table 9 shows the differing values of the independent variables examined in 
all three policy reversals. Despite some intriguing correlations already identified, no 
obvious causal relationship exists. It is only when the instruments of U.S. policy worked 
to magnify the isolation of the Libyan leadership, and when that leadership felt secure 
enough to make a potentially unpopular decision, that their influence on the 2003 reversal 




Table 9.   Differing Values of the Variables for Each of the Three Cases 
Year Policy Objective Threat Sanctions Result 
1987 B and C Existential Not Very Not Proportional  
  But limited Effective Not Reciprocal 
1999 B Non-existential Somewhat Proportional  
  And Limited Effective Reciprocal 
2003 B Implied Existential Not Very Somewhat-Proportional
  And Sustained Effective Somewhat-Reciprocal 
 
B.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
1. The Libyan Model in Farsi 
At first glance, Iran seems to be a good candidate for application of the ‘Libyan 
model.’ Both countries are dependent on oil exports for the majority of their national 
income and would be vulnerable to sanctions. Both seek a regional leadership role. Both 
defined their political identity in opposition to the United States. Iran’s government is 
also struggling with an internal division between a pragmatic faction and an ideological 
faction. If U.S. policy could magnify antecedent conditions in Iran, as in Libya, perhaps 
Iran could be convinced to abandon its quest for WMD as well.  
The first step of designing the appropriate policy is to define the desired end state. 
U.S. policy toward Iran is in transition. Until recently, Libya and Iran were subjected to 
nearly identical U.S. policy. In fact, the ILSA targeted both countries with the same 
sanctions regime. Also like Libya, the U.S. has menaced Iran’s coast, and at times, 
skirmished with Iranian naval and air forces. However, since the election of President 
Obama, the goal of U.S. policy toward Iran has changed. During the Bush administration, 
Iran was explicitly included in the “Axis of Evil.” U.S. policy was clearly gear toward 
regime change, or a type C objective. President Obama, equally explicitly, changed the 
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goal of U.S. policy to non-proliferation, or type B objective.213 To date, the new 
emphasis on engagement has not produced any Iranian concessions. However, continued 
Iranian defiance has won some support for a more stringent sanctions regime. Russia and 
France have recently joined the United States in calling for targeted multilateral 
sanctions.214 Although, like in the case of Libya, it is unlikely that oil consuming nations, 
like China and India, will agree to an embargo on Iranian oil. Thus, if regime change is 
off the table and an oil embargo is not likely, what U.S. policies would be most effective? 
The answer is whatever helps discredit the ideologues and makes their policy more risky, 
expensive or unpopular.  
The second step of designing the appropriate U.S. policy is to account for the 
antecedent conditions already at work. Iran today is caught between an ideological 
faction that has taken over the government and a somewhat popular pragmatic faction 
that is out of power. Like in Libya, the WMD program is central to the ideological 
faction’s policy of resisting the United States Unlike in Libya, the ideological faction has 
not been discredited enough to allow the pragmatic faction to make policy. In addition, 
unlike in Libya, U.S. policy toward Iran has not helped discredit or make ideological 
decision making more costly.  
Iranian non-compliance with regard its nuclear program could be made more 
costly in several ways but not militarily. The United States lacks the same ‘coercive 
credibility’ it had with Libya for several reasons. First, Iran is a much harder target. The 
size of Iran and its military dwarf Libya’s. Additionally, the nuclear facilities are 
hardened targets deep inside the country’s borders. Even if regime change in Iran were an 
implied threat, it would be a much more ambitious undertaking than regime change in 
Iraq, Afghanistan or Libya. Although the supreme leader rules as a dictator, succession 
has not been as divisive, or life threatening, as in many Arab governments. The Libyan 
government could be decapitated within days. The Iranian government is a complex mix  
 
                                                 
213 Julian Borger, “Obama Offers ‘Extended Hand’ during 2009,” The Guardian Weekly, December 
17, 2009. 
214 “West Pushes for ‘Strong Sanctions’ against Iran,” BBC, February 8, 2010. 
 66
of theocrats, revolutionaries and politicians all on top of an institutionalized authoritarian 
government. For all these reasons, the threat of force against Iran today is less convincing 
that it was against Libya in 2003.  
In Qadhafi’s case, the abandonment of WMD required two key ingredients. First, 
the pragmatic faction inside the government had to hold sway over a discredited 
ideological faction, and second, the Qadhafi government had to be secure enough to 
make potentially unpopular policy decisions. In Iran, the cost of ideological policy is not 
high enough to warrant capitulating to U.S. demands. Additionally, concessions from the 
current Iranian government are unlikely as long as the opposition remains a threat.  
However, because the ideological faction is sensitive to domestic opposition, 
targeted sanctions and international diplomatic isolation can be effective in discrediting 
the government in the eyes of the Iranian people. Iran is likely to be as susceptible to 
diplomatic isolation as Libya was except for different reasons. Whereas Qadhafi reacted 
to diplomatic isolation because of his international ambitions, the Iranian people are more 
likely to blame their government’s policies for additional international stigma. If the 
Iranians could be diplomatically sanctioned, as Libya was, the Iranian people would be 
less supportive of government policies that further isolate them internationally. The 
United States should call for a UN ban on Iranian commercial air travel until Iran 
complies with rules set forth by the International Atomic Energy Agency. As was the 
case with Libya, the most effective means to coerce the Iranian government would be to 
employ policy instruments in such a way as to magnify existing trends.  
C.  LOOKING AHEAD 
Libya has successfully rehabilitated its economic and diplomatic relations with 
the world. European and U.S. oil companies are back in force. The Qadhafi government 
sits atop huge oil revenues once again. Qadhafi spends most of this wealth pragmatically, 
reinvesting in the oil industry and other national infrastructure projects. Libya also 
continues to sponsor AU projects despite Qadhafi’s failed bid to extend his AU 
presidency. When Qadhafi goes, Libyan support of Pan-Africanism will go with him, if 
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not sooner.215 Until this happens, the United States and Qadhafi have shared interests in 
Africa. The 2009 AFRICOM posture statement calls for the development of security 
infrastructure at the national, regional and continental levels to defeat Al-Qaeda, conduct 
peace operations and fight WMD proliferation.216 Qadhafi has cooperated with the 
United States on all three of these issues and has shown an ongoing enthusiasm for Pan-
African projects. In the near term, the United States and Libya have a common interest in 
the security of Africa. The United States should offer a joint purchase of non-lethal 
military equipment to build an Africa Standby Force (ASF) infrastructure. Specifically, 
Libya could help finance the purchase of C-130 cargo aircraft to allow AU peacekeepers 
to self-deploy and resupply while deployed. Libyan sponsorship could effectively double 
AFRICOM’s equipment purchasing budget and jump-start some of the most ambitious 
and expensive AU security projects. The window of opportunity for such a cooperative 
venture between Libya and AFRICOM will probably only last as long as Qadhafi 
remains in power, but could reinforce the position of the pragmatists before the inevitable 
post-Qadhafi power struggle, potentially again tipping the balance. The risk of Libya 
returning to an anti-Western orientation is not likely considering the economic benefits of 
normalization with the West. Libya is a success story. However, it is still a dictatorship. 
Qadhafi’s heir apparent, Seif al-Isam, seems intent on continuing Libya’s 
pragmatic/authoritarian policy. U.S. policy needs to continue to make anti-Western 
policy costly while incentivizing cooperation.  
 
                                                 
215 “Gaddafi Threatens to Move Investments if Unity Fails,” ABC.NET News, January 30, 2008, 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/01/30/2150519.htm. 
216 United States Africa Command 2009 Posture Statement, April 1, 2009, 13. 
 68
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 69
APPENDIX. LIBYAN REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY  
To make a useful study of what constitutes an ideological policy reversal, a brief 
review of the tenants of Qadhafi’s official state ideology is required. The context of 
Libyan ideology begins with Nasser’s Pan-Arab nationalism of the 1950s and 1960s, but 
is also highly influenced by Islam. Where Nasser was a secular socialist whose great 
project of a great Pan-Arab union of nations, Qadhafi could not completely subordinate 
Islam to his ideology. As Francois Burgat summarized, 
Qadhafi has been more religious than Nasser and closer to the traditional 
values of Islam…Qadhafi from the beginning attempted to make Libya the 
first Arab state to embark upon at least a partial re-Islamization.217 
What made early Libyan ideology different from Nasser’s Pan-Arab socialism 
was a new emphasis on Islam. It retained all of the revolutionary ideology of the 1950s 
and 60s, specifically anti-Israel, pan-Arab and anti-colonialism, but where Nasser was a 
secular nationalist, Qadhafi was inspired by Sufi Islam.  As a result, nightclubs and cafes 
were closed, alcohol has banned, fasting was legally enforced during Ramadan and the 
regime publicly promised to impose shariah.218 At the time, shortly after the 1967 Arab 
defeat against Israel and before the successful Iranian revolution, Qadhafi’s semi-
religiously justified coup was welcomed by the Muslim world. As described in 1983,  
More than any other single event marked the beginning of the Islamic 
revival…Coming after decades of seemingly irreversible Westernization 
throughout Islamdom, his actions gave heart to [Muslim] legalists 
everywhere and attracted worldwide attention to the Shari’a.219 
Tellingly, when his concept of Pan-Arabism was threatened by more traditional 
Islamists, like the Muslim Brotherhood, they were quickly declared enemies of the state. 
According to his logic, if a different Islamist vision became a threat to his regime, it was 
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also a threat to all his revolutionary goals, and therefore, must be an agent of the West. 
From an interview in 1987, it is clear that his version of Islam is the only version 
compatible with his revolution. 
Today what we call Muslim Brothers… are the servants of imperialism. 
They are members of the reactionary right-wing; [they are] the enemies of 
progress, of socialism, and Arab unity.220  
This mix of religious and political ideologies was codified in 1972 when Qadhafi 
released the Green Book in three small volumes. Inspired by Mao Zedong’s Little Red 
Book, Qadhafi’s ‘new gospel’ was influenced by Bedouin culture, Islam, Marxism, 
Fascism and a confused mixture of other ideologies. Most significantly to any official 
‘state’ ideology was the Third Universal Theory, which was a rejection of capitalism and 
communism as economic models as well as man-made laws (constitutions, political 
parties and parliamentary democracy) as political models. Instead, the only legitimate 
form of government was ‘direct democracy’ through ‘popular congresses and 
committees’ in which consensus substitutes for elections.221  
In place of capitalism (or communism), the Green Book prescribes a middle 
course of Arab socialism. It declares that every person is entitled to a house, a vehicle and 
an income but that working for a wage is a form of slavery and money should be 
abolished.  
However, owning more than one house leads to rent, which leads to usury, which 
is un-Islamic. Therefore, ownership of more than one home or car per family was 
forbidden. Bank accounts were limited to $34,000 in holdings. Commerce and private 
trade was abolished, which ended any amount of a mixed domestic economy. Of course, 
favored members of the ‘workers committees’ were allowed to ignore these laws, which 
led to widespread corruption.222  
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Despite all the official populist egalitarian rhetoric, Libyan government 
institutions are characterized by centralization and neo-patrimonialism223 common in 
rentier states.224 Whether Qadhafi actually believes any of his socialist ideology or 
whether it is simply a means to control the economy, and therefore, potential rivals is 
debatable. What is not debatable is that only a relatively small population floating on oil 
could afford such controlled economy. To this day, the Libyan economy is a prototypical 
rentier economy. It is this complete control of the economy, from which nearly all the 
nation’s wealth is generated by the government that allows Libya to pursue such an 
activist, and expensive, foreign policy agenda. 
One of Qadhafi’s first and most ambitious foreign policy initiatives was the union 
of Libyan, Syria and Egypt along the same model as the original United Arab Republic 
(UAR) between Egypt and Syria. Nasser’s death in 1970 ended the project. Egypt’s new 
president refused Qadhafi’s attempts to join the two nations, as did all other Arab leaders. 
Qadhafi’s response was the ‘Zuwara speech’ of 1973. In it, Qadhafi spelled out how 
greater Arab unity was not possible under the existing forms of government. His logic 
was simply that because all Arabs naturally want to participate in a greater Arab union, 
the failure of that project is due to governments frustrating that desire. Only through the 
dismantling of the state’s institutions can the will of the people be realized. Where 
communists hold that a vanguard party unlocks the potential power of the people’s will, 
‘direct democracy’ was the new means to achieve a Pan-Arab state. Conveniently, it also 
justified the destruction of most other state institutions that could pose a threat to the 
regime. This revolutionary ideology was further codified in the Green Book and reached 
a revolutionary peak of sorts in 1977 when Qadhafi proclaimed beginning of the jamahiri 
system, or people’s power. As Burgat explains, it was the ideological justification for 
some of Libya’s most violent foreign policy projects. 
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The Sabha declaration marked the beginning of a period of activism and 
subversive diplomacy aimed at spreading the tenants of the Libyan 
leader’s thoughts. Embassies were transformed into People’s Bureaus; 
ministries, the army and police disappeared, at least in theory. All 
organized institutions within the country, from the local to the national 
level, were disbanded; the Leninist utopia, with its call for the dissolution 
of the state, was ardently pursued.225  
Discerning how Qadhafi’s Neo-Nasser ideology is applied to foreign policy is 
best summed up by Kenneth Pollack. 
In the 1970s, Qadhafi had three driving foreign policy ambitions. First was 
the goal of Arab unification, of which a crucial component was the 
eradication of the State of Israel from the ‘Arab’ Middle East. Second was 
the support and strengthening of Islamic states and Muslim minorities 
throughout the world. Last was the battle against ‘Imperialism’.226  
Although Pollack greatly simplifies the official rhetoric, these three goals make a 
useful yard stick to measure policy reversals. 
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